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 Depression is a serious public health concern that affects large numbers of individuals. 
Furthermore, individuals who experience a major depressive episode are at increased risk for 
additional episodes. It is important for research to examine the underlying mechanisms 
contributing to depression and develop interventions to prevent and reduce depressive relapse. 
Cognitive models of depression hold that depression is caused by biases in information 
processing. Thus, to address depression vulnerability, it is essential to consider information 
processing styles that may be beneficial. One such processing style is a type of appraisal termed 
big picture thinking. Big picture thinking involves considering context in order to obtain a wider 
perspective when in the midst of adversity. 
Existing research in the field of cognitive bias modification has begun to explore methods 
of altering biases in information processes. The present study contributes to this line of work by 
targeting a depression vulnerable population and examining the extent to which cognitive bias 
modification for interpretation (CBM-I) can be used to encourage big picture thinking, an 
appraisal style thought to be beneficial for depression vulnerability.  
 
 v 
 The current study had two primary aims: 1) to determine whether CBM-I could be used 
to induce a big picture appraisal style and whether such training would transfer to other tasks; 2) 
to examine the extent to which training in big picture thinking would reduce emotional reactivity 
to failure, rumination, and depression vulnerability. The study compared a group that received 
repeated sessions of cognitive bias modification aimed at training big picture thinking to a 
personal appraisal control condition aimed at training personal interpretations. Results provide 
evidence that big picture thinking can be trained using CBM-I and can generalize. Participants in 
the big picture condition transferred big picture thinking to two other tasks, one similar to the 
training task and one dissimilar to the training task. Training effects on a self-report measure of 
big picture thinking were not observed. Contrary to hypotheses, the big picture condition did not 
show benefits in emotional reactivity, and did not show lower depression or rumination 















































Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
Problem of Depression 
  
 Depression is a serious public health concern (Wells & Sherbourne, 1999; Wulsin, 
Vaillant, & Wells, 1999). According to the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH), 
in 2012, an estimated 16 million adults aged 18 or older in the U.S. had at least one major 
depressive episode in the past year. This represented 6.9 percent of all U.S. adults. 
Furthermore, individuals who experience a major depressive episode are at increased risk 
for additional episodes, with each episode significantly increasing risk for future episodes 
(Mueller et al., 1999; Solomon et al., 1997). Not only does depression affect large 
numbers of individuals, but those suffering from depression struggle to access effective 
psychological treatments making it a costly disease for society at large. The World Health 
Organization ranks depression as the leading cause of burden of all diseases in middle 
and high-income countries (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2013). Given the substantial 
public health significance, it is important that research examine the underlying causes of 
depression and develop interventions that will effectively prevent and reduce depressive 
symptomology. 
 
Cognitive Model of Depression Vulnerability 
 
 Cognitive models of depression hold that depression is caused by biases in 
information processing (e.g. Beck, 1987).  Supporting these models, research has found 
that individuals prone to depression are more likely than others to attend more to 
emotionally negative cues (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), to interpret ambiguity in a 
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negative way (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002), 
and to selectively recall negative information (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Additionally, 
depression has been found to be associated with reduced vividness for positive imagery 
of both the future (Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski, Schmid, & Holmes, 2011) and the past 
(Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). One cognitive theory of depression vulnerability that 
has garnered much research support is Teasdale’s (1988) differential activation 
hypothesis (DAH). The DAH builds on Beck’s stressor-vulnerability model of depression 
which posits that specific patterns of negative thinking make a person particularly 
sensitive to stressors (Beck, 1987). According to the DAH, certain patterns of processing 
are established during early episodes of depression (Segal, Williams, Teasdale, & Gemar, 
1996; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) and these patterns lead to an association between 
depressed mood and negative patterns of thinking. Therefore, depressed mood reactivates 
the negative thinking patterns. In sum, according to cognitive models of depression, 
negative mood and information processing interact in ways that results in a feedback loop 
that serves to perpetuate dysphoria and lead the individual in a downward spiral of 
depression. 
 
Emotion Regulation: Reappraising from a Broader Vantage Point 
 
In seeking to address depression vulnerability and the associated biases in 
information processing, it is important to consider the type of processing styles that may 
prove beneficial for individuals prone to depression. Recent attention has been given to 
the important role of reappraisals in regulating emotion. Gross and Thompson (2007) 
have argued that reappraisal of stressors is an adaptive emotion regulation strategy 
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because it can alter cognitive-emotional responses at an early stage of processing and 
does not demand a high level of cognitive resources. Following from this, reappraisal 
may serve as an important tool in avoiding depression recurrence. The important question 
of what sorts of reappraisals are helpful in modulating emotional reactions has only 
begun to receive research attention. 
A promising new direction in reappraisal work has supported the utility of 
reappraisals that broaden individuals’ perspectives on distressing events. Several different 
approaches to conceptualizing wider perspective appraisals have been explored:  Rude et 
al. (2013, May) described big picture appraisal as considering context in order to obtain 
a wider perspective when in the midst of adversity. Rude et al. (2013, May; Rude & 
Miller, 2016) suggest that, at the most general level, the following dimensions are 
important aspects of big picture thinking from which benefits for emotion regulation, 
informed action, and well-being derive. It should be noted that these dimensions are 
interconnected and often co-occurring: 
1. How the event and/or one’s reactions to it fit into an extended time 
perspective. Across many different types of situations, a way to see the big picture is to 
appreciate an event within the larger context of time. Over time, distressing events tend to 
become less distressing.  
2. How experiences fit into the broader context of one’s life goals. At times, 
unpredictable and uncontrollable events thwart our attainment of things we want. The 
ability to manage the challenges of such realities depends on our ability to view these 
setbacks as part of a larger endeavor.  
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3.  How one’s experience fits into a broader human context in which people’s 
goals and experiences are fundamentally similar. In its broadest iteration, this is the 
notion that recognizing the universality of suffering and human fallibility can contribute 
to feeling a sense of unity with others, of not being alone.  
There is preliminary empirical support for the benefits of big picture appraisal. 
Rude, Mazzetti, Pal, and Stauble (2011) demonstrated that encouraging individuals to 
view social rejection experiences from a broader context by answering questions, such as, 
“How do you think you will view this event in 1–2 years?”, “How are your responses to 
this even similar to those of other people?”, and “How might a neutral observer describe 
this situation?”, decreased rumination compared to answering questions about why events 
happened or to a no-writing control. In addition, Miller, Rude and Haner (2015) found 
that participants trained in Big Picture Appraisal showed a trend toward reduced 
emotional reactivity to a stressor as compared to control participants. 
Other recent programs of research support the value of viewing difficult personal 
experiences from a broadened perspective. For example, in multiple studies, Ayduk, 
Kross, and their colleagues found that analyzing distressing events (asking why) from a 
distanced perspective (e.g., “take a few step back from the experience”) decreased 
rumination and negative affect (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Kross, Gard, Deldin, 
Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012).  
Schartau, Dalgleish, and Dunn (2009) conducted four studies in which 
participants trained to appraise negative experiences using what Schartau et al. termed 
perspective broadening (appraisal themes included: “Bad things happen—bad things 
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happen in the world, and I need to put them behind me and move on; Silver lining—there 
are usually some good aspects to every situation, and it is important to focus on these; 
Broader perspective—bad events are rare overall, and lots of good things are happening 
all the time; and Time heals—in the (near) future, this will not seem anywhere near as 
bad as it does now”) demonstrated superior outcomes compared to control participants.  
Cognitive Bias Modification  
  
Given the potential benefits of adopting appraisal styles that entail taking a 
broader vantage point, it is important to consider ways in which this type of thinking can 
be induced in individuals. Cognitive bias modification (CBM) provides one possible 
mechanism. The term CBM refers to procedures designed to change particular styles of 
cognitive processing that are theorized to contribute to emotional dysfunction using 
systematic practice in an alternative processing style (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). 
Cognitive Bias Modification of Interpretation (CBM-I) paradigms offer the possibility of 
isolating the causal influence of changes in cognitive interpretations and therefore 
represent an important tool in clinical theory building (Woud & Becker, 2014). As Koster 
et al. (2009) point out, one value of CBM training is that evidence suggests that training 
occurs mostly implicitly and that the bias, when observed on a similar task, is not 
produced intentionally (Hertel, Holmes, & Benbow, 2013). Further, there is much current 
interest in adaptation of CBM techniques for use as clinical treatments, either adjunctive 
or stand-alone, because of advantages including convenience, flexibility, and autonomy 
of administration (Yiend et al., 2014).  
While CBM research has made many important contributions to our 
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understanding of the causal role cognitive biases play in emotional dysfunction, there 
remain a number of ways in which the CBM paradigm can be expanded. In his review of 
CBM procedures in the management of mental disorders, MacLeod and Mathews (2012) 
points out that while much research has demonstrated the effectiveness of CBM-I in 
alleviating anxiety, little research has examined the effects of CBM-I on depression.  
An important area for investigation involves the question of whether CBM-I can 
contribute to the illumination of causal mechanisms contributing to the development as 
well as the treatment of clinical depression. Several studies have examined the impact of 
CBM training that emphasizes the use of imagery on depression. The use of such training 
to address depression follows from the ideas that imagery may have a more powerful 
impact on emotional responses than verbal processing of the same material (Holmes, 
Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006), and that depression is characterized by 
reduced vividness for positive imagery of both the future and the past (Lang, Blackwell, 
Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012). Other studies have developed CBM training 
protocols that target particular styles of interpretation thought to be beneficial for those 
experiencing depression. Such studies have included training concrete thought (Watkins 
et al., 2011), appraisals of negative intrusive memories (Newby, Lang, Werner-Seidler, 
Holmes, & Moulds, 2014), and positive attribution style (Peters, Constans & Mathews, 
2011). Studies have also begun to explore the impact of CBM training on mood reactivity, 
a symptom of depression vulnerability. Miller, Rude, and Haner (2015) found 
preliminary indications that CBM training of big picture appraisal led to a trend of less 
mood reactivity than control training. As Peters et al. (2011) argue, support for specific 
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theories of depression can be augmented by experimental work that demonstrates how 
changes in cognitive biases are associated with changes in vulnerability to depression.  
The Present Study: Training Big Picture Thinking 
 
 The present study seeks to build on previous work by examining whether big 
picture appraisal can be trained using CBM procedures and how such training may 
translate to benefits related to depression vulnerability. Miller et al. (2015) showed 
preliminary indications that big picture thinking can be induced using CBM-I and that 
such training may impact stress reactivity. Using the Miller et al. (2015) study as a 
starting point, the present study sought to extend upon this work in a number of ways. 
First, the current study targeted individuals vulnerable to depression rather than 
unselected college students as were used in Miller et al. (2015) in order to assess 
particular benefits of big picture thinking for this population. Second, while Miller et al. 
(2015) used one training session, the present study included six training sessions over the 
course of a week. Additionally, in the current study an attempt was made to enhance 
training effects by emphasizing the use of imagery and including auditory items in 
addition to written items. Finally, the current study assessed participants at a two-week 
follow-up session as well as a three-month follow-up session, allowing for the testing of 
CBM-I effects over time.  
In summary, the study used a depression vulnerable sample and compared a 
condition that receives repeated sessions of CBM aimed at training big picture thinking to 
a personal appraisal control group aimed at making more personal interpretations. It was 
predicted that those participants in the big picture condition would show generalization of 
 
 8 
big picture thinking to tasks both similar to the training task and different from the 
training task. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that participants in the big picture 
condition would display reduced emotional reactivity in response to laboratory-induced 
stress, reduced cognitive biases, and reduced depressive symptomology over the course 





Chapter 2:  
Literature Review  
Depression Vulnerability 
 
 Depression is a serious public health concern. Research shows that 6.6% of the 
U.S. population have experienced clinical depression in the past year, and between 18 
and 22% of women and 7 and 11% of men will suffer a clinical depression during their 
lifetime (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2013). Further, while depression affects 
significant numbers of people, individuals with depression are not likely to seek 
treatment. Of those who do seek treatment, only 22% actually see a specialist for their 
problem and receive adequate treatment (Segal et al., 2013).  
 In addition to the significant emotional suffering incurred by those with the 
disorder, evidence suggests that the level of functional impairment associated with 
depression is comparable to that found in major medical illnesses, including cancer and 
coronary artery disease. Wells, Sturm, Sherbourne and Meredith (1996) found that 
depressed patients spent more time in bed (1.4 days per month) than patients with lung 
disease (1.2 days per month), diabetes (1.15 days per month), or arthritis (0.75 days per 
month). Further, workers suffering form depression have five time more work-loss days 
than their healthy counterparts. According to a World Health Organization projection for 
the year 2020, of all diseases, depression will impose the second-largest burden of ill 
health worldwide (Murray & Lopez, 1998). 
 Research has shown that a large contributor to prevalence rates of depression 
worldwide was the return of new episodes of depression in people who had already 
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experienced one episode. A seminal study by Keller et al. (1983) followed 141 depressed 
individuals for 13 months and found that 43 (33%) had relapsed after having been well 
for at least 8 weeks. Similarly, later research has found that at least 50% of patients who 
recover from an initial episode of depression will have at least one subsequent depressive 
episode (24). For those individuals with a history of two or more episodes, the likelihood 
of recurrence in their life increases to 70-80%. In a widely disseminated review, Judd 
(1997) concluded, “unipolar depression is a chronic, lifelong illness, the risk for repeated 
episodes exceeds 80%, patients will experience an average of 4 lifetime major depressive 
episodes of 20 weeks’ duration each” (p. 990). These finding highlight the importance of 
developing preventive measures targeting depression vulnerable individuals. In 
considering such measures, it is important to elucidate the factors that contribute to 
relapse.  
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression vulnerability. The work of Aaron T. 
Beck, beginning in the 1960s, served to provide the basis for cognitive models of 
depression. Beck identified distorted, negative cognition (primarily thoughts and beliefs) 
as a central feature of depression. According to Beck’s theory, individuals prone to 
depression have basic beliefs about themselves, their world, and other people, that are 
problematic and produce maladaptive cognitions (Beck, J., 2011). It is thought that 
beliefs about oneself, other people, and the world (termed “core beliefs”) develop during 
childhood based on the experiences one has growing up. The cognitive model posits that 
when people find themselves in situations, problematic automatic thoughts are activated 
that are directly influenced by their core beliefs. Automatic thoughts then influence the 
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ways in which one reacts to situations (Ledley, Marx, & Heimberg, 2010). Many studies 
have validated the cognitive model of depression and anxiety. A comprehensive review 
of these studies can be found in Clark and Beck (2010). 
Following from these ideas, Beck developed cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) to 
address dysfunctional thinking. CBT makes use of controlled processes, or those that are 
part of the individual’s awareness, to combat depressive cognitions. According to Beck, 
when people learn to evaluate their thinking in more realistic and adaptive ways, they 
experience improvement in their emotional states and in their behaviors. Cognitive 
behavior therapy has been extensively tested since the time the first outcome study was 
published in 1977 (Rush, Beck, Kovacs, & Hollon, 1978). Outcome studies have 
demonstrated the effectiveness of CBT for a wide range of psychiatric disorders, 
psychological problems, and medical problems with psychological components (e.g. 
Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Cambless & Ollendick, 2001). 
Differential activation hypothesis of depression vulnerability. A number of 
theories have followed in the footsteps of Beck’s cognitive model of depression. One 
such theory is Teasdale’s differential activation hypothesis (DAH) for explaining 
depressive relapse. According to the DAH, vulnerability to depression is powerfully 
related to patterns of thinking that are activated in the depressed state. The DAH assumes 
that certain patterns of processing are established during early episodes of depression 
(Segal, Williams, Teasdale, & Gemar, 1996; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). These patterns 
lead to an association between depressed mood and negative patterns of thinking. 
Therefore, depressed mood reactivates the negative thinking patterns. The reactivation of 
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negative cognitions in this theory is a relatively automatic process, often operating 
outside the individual’s control.  
 Much research has confirmed the differential activation hypothesis. In a number 
of studies, individuals who were not currently depressed, but who had been depressed in 
the past, were examined with and without sad mood induction. Findings indicated that the 
negative mood induced in the study had a more significant impact for those with a history 
of depression. Individuals who had previously been depressed exhibited an exaggerated 
cognitive bias in response to negative mood induction (Segal & Ingram, 1994). Further 
support for the DAH was garnered by Miranda and Persons (1990) through their 
examination of the effects of mood on dysfunctional attitudes. They found that when 
never-depressed individuals reported being sad, their endorsement of dysfunctional 
attitudes changed relatively little. Contrastingly, when formerly depressed individuals 
reported feeling sad, they were more likely to endorse dysfunctional attitudes. 
 Automatic and controlled processes relevant to depression. Some of the 
cognitive processes assumed to be important in bringing about depressed mood are 
automatic and some are controlled. The dual process model of depression vulnerability 
represents another cognitive model that provides useful insights to the development and 
maintenance of depression. This model incorporates the ways in which both controlled 
and automatic processes play a role in depression. According to dual process models 
(Beevers, 2005; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 1999; 2000;), individuals possess two types of information processing. The 
first is an associative mode that involves quick, effortless processing that relies on well-
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learned associations. The second in a reflective mode that involves slow, effortful 
processing that relies on symbolic, rule-based inferences. The associative mode occurs 
automatically, however, when expectancies and well-learned associations are violated, 
the reflective mode intervenes if enough cognitive resources are available to respond. 
According to this theory, individuals become vulnerable to depression when negatively 
biased associative processing is uncorrected by reflective processing (Beevers, 2005). 
 This theory follows from Beck’s original idea that negatively biased self-referent 
associative processing provides the basis for a cognitive vulnerability to depression. For 
example, a person who makes automatic negative associations when processing 
information about the self may be particularly susceptible to depression. While negatively 
biased associative processing provides a basis for cognitive vulnerability to depression, 
reflective processing can overcome this bias. According to Beevers (2005), however, 
there are at least three instances in which associative processing is not likely to be 
corrected: 1) cognitive resources are not adequate to support reflective processing; 2) a 
need for reflective processing is not realized; 3) reflective processing does not adequately 
adjust negatively biased associative processing. If negative associative processing is not 
corrected, this can be the impetus for a downward spiral into depression that involves the 
maintenance of dysphonic mood states and the continued depletion of cognitive resources 
(Beevers, 2005). 
 The interplay between associative and reflective processing has important 
implications for mood regulation. Forgas et al., (e.g. Forgas, 2000) argue that associative 
processing is used to maintain mood while reflective processing is used to change mood. 
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These researchers posit that associative processing maintains mood states by retrieving 
information congruent to the current mood, however, when mood incongruent 
information is present, reflective processing kicks in to alter and repair the current mood 
state. To investigate these ideas, Forgas and Ciarrochi (2002) gave participants mood 
inductions. Then, participants completed a series of social tasks. Consistent with the 
model, participant responses to these tasks were initially mood congruent, however, with 
time, responses became mood incongruent. The researchers argue these findings 
demonstrate that associative processing was initially used by participants, but reflective 
processing was later engaged in order to return mood to baseline.  
Given these contributing factors to depression vulnerability, it is important to 
consider how this theory may be used to alter cognitive vulnerability. It may be important 
to develop depression treatments that specifically target biased associative processing 
(Beevers, 2005). This requires altering well-established patterns and associations. While 
this is a difficult feat, a process called consolidation (McClelland, McNaughton, & 
O’Really, 1995) offers a possible mechanism for accomplishing this. Consolidation 
involves an individual accumulating enough experience with a particular association that 
it becomes integrated within the associative system. Following from this, repeated 
exposure to new associations is needed to consolidate results of reflective processing to 
associative processing (Beevers, 2005). Another possible way to intervene may be to help 
individuals adopt reflective processing styles that would help them adaptively respond to 






Empirical study of emotion regulation is critical for a number of reasons. Perhaps 
most notably, emotion regulatory processes are central to mental health. Emotion 
dysregulation is estimated to be involved in over half of the DSM-IV Axis I disorders and 
in all of the Axis II disorders (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Attention is currently turning to 
the process of emotion regulation as one element in the development of effective 
therapeutic treatments. Additional research is needed to further our understanding of the 
connection between emotional development, emotion regulation, and the emotional 
disorders (Moses & Barlow, 2006).  
Defining emotion regulation. The field of emotion regulation is devoted to 
examining the ways in which individuals influence their emotions and how such 
modifications contribute to various psychological outcomes. In his seminal article on the 
subject, Gross (1998) defines emotion regulation as, “the process by which individuals 
influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and 
express these emotions” (p. 275). It is important to note that emotion regulation can be 
done consciously or unconsciously and regulatory strategies may be automatic or 
controlled. Gross highlights the complexity of emotion regulation by explaining that 
emotions are multicomponential processes involving aspects of behavioral, experiential, 
and physiological domains.  
Process model of emotion regulation. Gross suggests a process-oriented 
approach to conceptualizing emotion regulation strategies. He distinguishes five sets of 
emotion regulatory processes: situation selection, situation modification, attention 
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deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross, 1998). These five 
processes fall under the two broad categories of antecedent-focused emotion regulation, 
or processes that occur before emotion is generated, and response-focused emotion 
regulation, processes that occur after emotion is generated (Gross, 1998; Gross & Munoz, 
1995). Response modulation is the only one of the five processes that falls under the 
category of response-focused emotion regulation strategies.  
 Within the broader categories of these five processes, a number of specific 
emotion regulation strategies have been defined. For instance, problem solving falls 
under the larger process of situation modification. Distraction, rumination, and 
concentration represent strategies that are involved in attentional deployment processes. 
The process of cognitive change is particularly relevant to the present study. One form of 
cognitive change that has received recent attention is reappraisal, or the process of 
transforming a situation so as to alter its emotional impact. As various strategies have 
been defined, it is important to determine the consequences associated with each. 
 Adaptive and maladaptive forms of emotion regulation. A number of studies 
have begun to explore the various emotion regulation strategies in an attempt to 
determine which strategies are beneficial to individuals and which are not. Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema, and Schweizer (2010) conducted a meta-analytic review examining the 
relationships between six emotion-regulation strategies (acceptance, avoidance, problem 
solving, reappraisal, rumination, and suppression) and symptoms of four 
psychopathologies (anxiety, depression, eating, and substance-related disorders). Among 
their findings, results showed reappraisal, problem solving, and acceptance served as 
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adaptive regulatory strategies across a variety of contexts. In contrast, suppression, 
avoidance, and rumination were found to be maladaptive strategies.  
 More specifically, Aldoa et al. (2010) conducted a direct comparison of the 
degree to which each emotion regulation strategy was related to psychopathology. The 
researchers found that the relationship between emotion regulation strategies and 
psychopathology may vary by strategy and type of psychopathology. Certain emotion 
regulation strategies were more strongly related to overall pathology than others. For 
instance, when studying the relationship between each emotion regulation strategy across 
the four disorders, they found that the effect size for rumination was large, effect sizes for 
avoidance, problem solving, and suppression were medium to large, and effect sizes for 
reappraisal and acceptance were small to medium. This particular finding may 
demonstrate that maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are more harmful than the 
relative absence of adaptive strategies. In addition, the relationships between certain 
emotion regulation strategies were stronger for depression and anxiety than for substance 
abuse and eating disorders suggesting that mood-related disorders may be more closely 
related to certain problems in emotion regulation than externalizing disorders. 
 Reappraisal. Reappraisal represents one such regulatory strategy involving 
attentional deployment.  Gross and John define reappraisal as a form of cognitive change 
that involves construing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in such a way that 
changes its emotional influence. These researchers (2007) have argued that reappraisal 
of stressors is an adaptive emotion regulation strategy because it can alter cognitive-
emotional processes arising in response to an emotion-inducing event at an early stage of 
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processing and does not demand a high level of cognitive resources. In support of this, 
studies have tended to show reduced distress and physiological reactivity among 
individuals who reappraise (Goldin, Manber-Ball, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 2009; 
Gross, 1998).   
 Gross and John (2003) conducted a series of studies that illuminated the specific 
benefits of reappraisal by examining individual differences in use of reappraisal versus 
suppression and the implications of such differences on affect, well-being, and social 
relationships. Expressive suppression was defined as a form of response modulation that 
entails the inhibition of emotion-expressive behavior. In contrast to reappraisal, 
suppression is a response-focused strategy. It occurs relatively late in the emotion 
generative process, and primarily modifies the behavioral aspect of emotion response 
tendencies.  
In order to designate individuals as “reappraisers” or “suppressors”, the 
researchers derived the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). For each item on the 
ERQ, the researchers labeled which emotion regulatory process was being measured. 
Examples of items include, “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the 
situation I’m in” (reappraisal) and “I control my emotions by not expressing them” 
(suppression). Additionally, both the reappraisal scale of the ERQ as well as the 
suppression scale included at least one item asking about regulating negative emotions 
and one item about regulating positive emotions. The resulting ERQ consisted of 10 
items that participants rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
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To study the implications of using suppression and reappraisal for affective 
responding, the researchers related ERQ Reappraisal and Suppression to self-reports of 
emotion experience, and to self- and peer-reports of emotion expression. In choosing to 
include peer-reports, the researchers explain that many instances of emotion expression 
both take place in social interaction and are often triggered by social interaction. Thus, 
peers serve as a rich source of information regarding an individual’s emotionally 
expressive behavior. To further examine the implication of emotion regulation on social 
functioning, participants completed measures of avoidance and attachment, peers rated 
individuals on relationship closeness as well as peer liking, and indices of social support 
(Emotional Support and Instrumental Support scales from the COPE) were included. 
Finally, to assess overall Well-Being, the following instruments were administered: the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
Scale (CES-D), the Self-Rating Depression Scale, the Satisfaction With Life Scale, and 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale. 
Gross and John’s findings demonstrate a number of implications of individual 
differences in those who use reappraisal as compared to those who employ suppression. 
Reappraisers were found to negotiate stressful situations by taking an optimistic attitude, 
reinterpreting what they find stressful, and making active efforts to repair negative moods. 
Reappraisers both experience and express more positive emotion and less negative 
emotion than those who reappraise less frequently. Socially, reappraisers are more likely 
to share both positive and negative emotions with others, and they have closer social 
 
 20 
relationships. In regards to well-being, reappraisers demonstrate fewer depressive 
symptoms, greater self-esteem and higher life-satisfaction.  
On the other hand, suppressors experience themselves as inauthentic, feeling that 
they mislead others about their true self. Compared with those who do not use 
suppression, they handle stressful situations by masking their inner feelings and working 
to hide their outward display of emotion. They have less clarity regarding their feelings, 
are less successful at mood repair, and view their emotions in a less favorable or 
accepting light. They have less positive emotional experience and expression. They 
experience more negative emotions including distressing feelings of inauthenticity. 
Socially, suppressors appear reluctant to share both negative and positive emotions with 
others and they avoid close relationships. Finally, suppressors score lowest in the domain 
of positive relations with others, they have lower levels of self-esteem, are less satisfied 
with life, and have more depressive symptoms. 
 In sum, the findings of Gross and John extend prior empirical work by 
demonstrating the following: individuals differ in their use of suppression and reappraisal; 
these differences are significant and meaningful; and these differences have systematic 
effects in naturally occurring situations. Also, these findings show long-term 
consequences of using reappraisal and suppression in everyday life. 
Reappraisal Strategies that Encourage Taking a Wider Vantage Point 
 
It is clear that reappraisal represents a powerful and beneficial emotion regulation 
strategy. Thus, it is important to consider which types of reappraisals are most likely to 
prove beneficial for individuals. A number of researchers have taken various approaches 
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to address this question. The work of several labs, has supported the utility of reappraisals 
that broaden individuals’ perspectives on distressing events (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011; 
Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Rude et al., 2011; Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009).  
Self-distancing. Kross and colleagues (e.g. Kross & Ayduk, 2011) have 
conducted a series of studies examining an appraisal strategy they term “self-distancing”. 
This work began in an effort to address what Kross and Aykuk (2011) call the “self-
reflection paradox”. This paradox refers to contradictory findings regarding self-
reflection in current literature. On the one hand, a number of studies suggest that 
reflecting on negative emotions leads to important physical and mental health benefits 
(e.g. Pennebaker, 1997). Theory suggests that through reflection, people develop 
explanations for their negative experiences, providing them with closure and emotional 
relief. On the other hand, another set of studies indicate that people’s attempts to 
understand their feelings are harmful, leading to ruminations that make them feel worse 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Acknowledging this paradox, Kross 
and Ayduk set out to explore why self-reflection on negative experiences sometimes 
succeeds and at other times fails. More specifically, Kross and Ayduk set out to locate the 
psychological mechanisms that enable individuals to reflect on negative experiences 
adaptively. 
 In their effort to address this question, Kross and Ayduk began studying self-
distancing, an approach to negative experiences that allows individuals to focus on the 
broader context of the situation at hand in order to reconstrue their experiences in ways 
that reduce distress. These researchers conceptualize self-distancing as becoming an 
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observer of the self. The idea is that self-distancing allows individuals to process their 
negative emotions and experiences from an ego-decentered, third person perspective. 
This enables individuals to contemplate emotional experiences without activating intense 
levels of affect. The person is better able to achieve representations of the reasons 
underlying their negative experience. Thus, the authors point out that self-distancing 
capitalizes on the unique benefits associated with both emotional approach and emotional 
avoidance strategies in that it functions to decrease emotional reactivity, as avoidance 
strategies do when successfully implemented, while simultaneously allowing the 
individual to focus on and work through negative feelings, an important feature of 
adaptive emotional approach strategies. A number of studies (described below) 
subsequently demonstrated the beneficial nature of this type of perspective/appraisal.  
 Kross and colleagues (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011) have found in multiple studies 
that participants instructed to analyze reasons for a distressing event while adopting a 
self-distanced perspective (e.g. “…take a few steps back and move away from your 
experience…watch the experience unfold as if it were happening all over again to the 
distant you…” Kross & Ayduk, 2008, p. 926), experience less distress, lower 
physiological reactivity, and less rumination as compared to control participants 
instructed to adopt either a self-immersed perspective (e.g. “… relive the situation as if it 
were happening to you all over again” Kross & Ayduk, 2008, p. 926) or participants 
instructed to adopt a distraction strategy. Self-distancing has also been associated with 
more problem-solving behavior and less reciprocation of negativity during conflicts 
(Ayduk & Kross, 2010). In addition, reflecting on past provocations from a self-distanced 
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perspective was found to reduce aggressive thoughts and angry feelings (Kross, Gard, 
Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012). Benefits have been found both immediately following 
and up to one week after the self-distancing manipulation (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Ayduk 
& Kross, 2010; Kross et al., 2005). Kross and colleagues (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011) 
have interpreted their self-distancing manipulation as helping participants view 
distressing events in context. 
Perspective broadening. Schartau et al. (2009) represent another group of 
researchers examining a type of big picture appraisal. Shartau and colleagues conducted a 
series of studies in which participants trained to appraise negative experiences using what 
the researchers termed perspective broadening demonstrated superior outcomes 
compared to control participants. In three studies, participants trained in perspective 
broadening were instructed to adopt one or more of four appraisal themes as they 
watched a series of distressing films. These appraisal themes included: “Bad things 
happen—bad things happen in the world, and I need to put them behind me and move on; 
Silver lining—there are usually some good aspects to every situation, and it is important 
to focus on these; Broader perspective—bad events are rare overall, and lots of good 
things are happening all the time; and Time heals—in the (near) future, this will not seem 
anywhere near as bad as it does now” (Shartau et al., 2009, p. 17). Control participants 
were given no appraisal instructions. In comparison, participants in the perspective 
broadening condition showed lower levels of self-reported negative emotion and 
electrodermal responses to a final test film. Similar effects were found in a follow-up 
study when participants were instructed to apply perspective broadening appraisal themes 
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to distressing autobiographical memories and demonstrated reduced intrusion and 
avoidance of negative memories relative to control participants. 
Big picture appraisal. Similar to perspective broadening work, Rude et al. (2011; 
Miller et al., 2015) defined an appraisal strategy called big picture appraisal.  Big picture 
appraisal is defined as viewing a difficult situation and one’s reactions to it in ways that 
transcend or go beyond the immediate perspective and view the situation in context. For 
current purposes, big-picture appraisal is operationally defined as maintaining awareness 
of how a distressing event and/or one’s reactions to it fit into one or more larger contexts: 
(1) an extended time perspective which includes an awareness of how emotional states 
fluctuate and distress tends to dissipate with time; (2) the broader context of one’s life 
goals; and (3) the broader human context, in which human wants and needs are 
fundamentally similar, and distress and fallibility are universal. 
In support of this framework, Rude et al. (2011) found that college students who 
reported a recent interpersonal rejection experienced lower levels of rumination after 
receiving an experimental big picture intervention as compared to either of two control 
interventions. Participants in the big picture reappraisal condition wrote in response to 
probe questions that encouraged them to consider how they would feel about the 
experience in 1-2 years time, how their responses were similar to those of other people, 
and how a neutral observer might describe the situation. Instructions for one control 
condition asked participants to explore the reasons for the event and their reactions to it 
(e.g., Why do you think this happened?); another control condition did not write about 
their rejection experience. 
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 Given that emotion regulation research has found certain styles of cognitive 
processing to be more beneficial than others, it is important for future work to examine 
the direct effects of specific appraisal strategies on clinical populations An innovative 
body of research called cognitive bias modification offers the tools to address such future 
directions.  
Cognitive Bias Modification 
 
The term CBM refers to procedures designed to change particular styles of 
cognitive processing that are theorized to contribute to emotional dysfunction using 
systematic practice in an alternative processing style (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). 
CBM procedures are designed to directly modify one specific low-level bias in selective 
information processing, usually assumed to operate automatically (Koster et al., 2009). 
These biases relate to attention, interpretation of ambiguity, memory, and appraisal, 
among other processes. In addition, CBM procedures do not rely on insight. The targeted 
biases do not need to be introspectively accessible to the individual. CBM simply seeks 
to change the target bias through extended practice on a task designed to induce change.  
Another component of CBM methodologies includes the study of what are 
referred to in the CBM literature (see Hertel & Mathews, 2011) as transfer tasks (also 
referred to as generalization tasks). The purpose of transfer tasks is to determine whether 
the style of thinking trained using CBM generalizes to other tasks.  
Hertel and Mathews distinguish between near transfer effects, those with a strong 
degree of overlap between training and transfer task and far transfer effects, those with a 
lesser degree of overlap between training and the nature of the transfer task. Most CBM 
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studies employ near-transfer tasks. That is, the situations during training are similar to 
those in the transfer phase. These near-transfer tasks are used to examine the extent to 
which training in one type of attention of interpretation task generalizes to other tasks 
with similar processing requirements. 
 Far-transfer effects are demonstrated when the context of the training and that of 
the transfer task are substantially different. Stressful transfer tasks such as emotional 
response to viewing a distressing video can be thought of as far-transfer tasks. Far-
transfer effects are powerful because they are used to establish causal links between 
cognitive processing bias and emotional reactivity.  
Many researchers (e.g. Lange et al., 2010) point to the need for studies to 
demonstrate transfer from CBM-I procedures to different bias measures, cognitive 
domains, and behavior. A number of studies have been successful in modifying cognitive 
biases, but have failed to show that these bias changes translate to behavior effects (e.g. 
Lange et al.,2010; Williams & Grisham, 2013). In their commentary on the special issue 
of cognitive bias modification, Fox, Mackintosh, and Holmes (2014) point out that many 
studies rely on self-report measures of clinical outcomes with few studies incorporating 
behavioral or somatic indicators of relevant symptoms. 
 The exact nature of CBM procedures depends on the particular type of bias being 
targeted as well as the psychological outcome under investigation. For the purpose of the 




CBM targeting interpretive selectivity. CBM procedures aimed at modifying 
interpretive biases (CBM-I) present participants with ambiguous information and 
encourage a certain type of interpretive style. The idea is that through practice, 
participants will come to adopt a particular pattern of selective interpretation. One 
version of CBM-I, first created by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) provided participants 
with a series of textual descriptions of ambiguous situations, and participants were 
instructed to complete a final word fragment that provided a meaningful ending to the 
vignette. In conditions inducing negative interpretive bias, final word fragments lead to 
negative interpretations of the preceding ambiguous vignette. In the positive interpretive 
bias induction group, fragment completions lead to positive interpretation of ambiguity. 
As an example, consider the following vignette (from Hertel & Mathews, 2011): 
 You have decided to go caving even though you feel nervous about being in an 
 enclosed space. You get to the caves before anyone else arrives. Going deep 
 inside the cave you realize you have completely lost your…w_y (way, a negative 
 interpretation) or f_ar (fear, a positive interpretation). 
Research has shown that extended practice using such training procedures leads to 
induced changes in interpretive biases (e.g., Grey & Mathews 2009).  
A number of studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of interpretive bias 
training in addressing anxiety. Mathews and Mckintosh (2000) found that participants 
trained in a positive interpretive bias subsequently reported lower state anxiety levels 
than those who completed the task in the negative interpretive bias condition. Additional 
research confirmed and extended these findings by showing that the same interpretive 
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bias training (positive condition vs. negative condition) led to significant decline not only 
in state anxiety but in trait anxiety questionnaire scores as well (Salemink, van den Hout, 
& Kindt, 2007, 2009). CBM-I procedures have also proven effective in decreasing social 
anxiety (Beard & Amir, 2008) and reducing the frequency of negative thought intrusions 
in worry-prone individuals (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009) and participants who meet 
diagnostic criteria for GAD (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010).  
Several researchers have examined whether CBM-I can influence subsequent 
emotional reactivity. Wilson, Smith, Chattington, Ford and Marple-Horvat (2006) 
conducted a study in which they delivered a single session of Grey and Mathews’ (2000) 
CBM-I task to mid-trait anxious students and then exposed them to a distressing video 
clip. Participants in the negative bias interpretation group demonstrated elevation of both 
state anxiety and depression in response to the video clips, while the clips did not lead to 
such elevations in the positive bias interpretation group. Additionally, Miller, Rude, and 
Haner (2015) found that college students given CBM-I for big picture thinking showed a 
trend toward endorsing less emotional reactivity following a stressor as compared to a 
control group. 
While a number of studies have found preliminary support for the effects of 
CBM-I on emotional reactivity, it should be noted that other studies have not been able to 
produce such effects (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Yiend et al., 2014). The mixed results 
regarding emotional reactivity suggest a need for further work to examine such results 
and to determine the conditions under which individuals are most likely to experience 
benefits in response to stress. 
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Researchers have also employed multiple sessions of CBM-I delivered over more 
extended periods of time in order to examine the extent to which CBM-I effects endure. 
Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, and Yiend (2007) delivered four CBM-I sessions across a 
two-week period to high trait anxious individuals. When assessed one week later, 
participants in the positive interpretive training condition demonstrated reduced negative 
interpretation of ambiguity and reported lowered trait anxiety scores than those in the 
control condition. Extended CBM-I procedures were also shown to be beneficial in 
reducing trait anxiety in individuals with a pre-existing high level of anxiety vulnerability 
(Salemink et al., 2009), and in decreasing social anxiety symptoms (Beard & Amir, 2008; 
Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prantzalou, 2009). 
Imagery based CBM-I. A number of studies have found powerful effects by 
incorporating the use of imagery in CBM-I training protocols (Torkan et al., 2014). 
Unlike other CBM-I approaches that require the active resolution of ambiguous scenario 
content (e.g. word fragment completion), imagery-based CBM-I often involves auditory 
presentation of scenarios describing everyday events. Listeners are asked to actively 
imagine the situations described using a first person perspective. Research has found it is 
important that the auditory scenarios be constructed such that they are initially 
emotionally ambiguous, with the emotional tone of the situation only becoming apparent 
in the final words (Clarke et al., 2014). One way many studies manipulate emotional 
imagery is by asking participants to rate the vividness of each scenario on a five-point 
scale from 1, perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision, to 5, no image at all. 
Researchers posit that imagery may have a more powerful impact on emotional responses 
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than verbal processing of the same material (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 
2006). 
The results of these studies support the idea that interpretive biases causally 
contribute to variation in vulnerability to and symptoms of various emotional 
disturbances, especially those related to anxiety and depression. Hence, these findings 
lend support to cognitive models of emotional dysfunction that implicate biased 
interpretation in the etiology of pathology. In addition, they bode well for the potential 
therapeutic value of CBM-I. 
CBM Studies Addressing Depression 
 
Preliminary work has begun to explore the effects of CBM on depression. One 
approach of such work has been to use CBM to target specific cognitive processes 
thought to contribute to depression. For example, a study by Watkins et al., (2012) 
created training aimed at inducing concrete thinking. Watkins et al. used a sample of 
individuals currently experiencing a depressive episode and compared treatment as usual 
(TAU), TAU plus concreteness training (CNT) guided self-help, and TAU plus relaxation 
training (RT) guided self-help. The concreteness training used in this study was designed 
to switch patients from an unhelpful abstract thinking habit to a helpful concrete thinking 
habit, targeting processes related to depression such as rumination and overgeneralization. 
Results from this study indicated the addition of CNT to TAU significantly improved 
depressive symptoms at post-treatment, 3- and 6-month follow-ups and for rumination 
and overgeneralization post-treatment. There was no difference in the reduction of 
symptoms between CNT and RT. 
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Newby, Lang, Werner-Seidler, Holmes, and Moulds (2014) compared the 
efficacy of computerized bias modification positive appraisal training (CBM) versus a 
therapist-delivered cognitive behavioral therapy session (CB-Education) that both aimed 
to target and alter negative appraisals of a negative intrusive autobiographical memory—
a common symptom of depression. The sample included dysphoric participants (Mean 
BDI-II = 27.85; N = 60). The CBM training used in this study was aimed specifically at 
addressing maladaptive appraisals of intrusive memories. Results showed that for both 
groups (CBM and CB-Education) there were significant reductions in mood (depression 
and anxiety), memory intrusiveness, and negative appraisals with the CB-Education 
group showing greatest reduction, followed by the CBM group. 
Micco, Henin, and Hirshfeld-Becker (2014) examined the effects of CBM-I in 
dysphoric adolescents and young adults (BDI-II > 14). The CBM-I training used in this 
study encouraged a positive interpretation of a series of scenarios. Results showed that 
both the CBM-I condition as well as the control condition experienced reductions in 
interpretation bias, however, when limited to those participants with negative bias at 
baseline (26 of the 45 participants), the intervention group showed greater improvement 
in interpretation bias. There were no differences found between groups in depression or 
anxiety symptom change. 
A number of studies have examined the effects of imagery based CBM-I training 
protocols (Torkan et al., 2014) in depressed or dysphoric samples. Researchers posit that 
imagery may have a more powerful impact on emotional responses than verbal 
processing of the same material (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). 
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Lang et al. (2012) argue that depression is characterized by reduced vividness for positive 
imagery of both the future and the past. Further, these researchers suggest that since 
imagining the outcome of a situation may be one powerful way of resolving ambiguity, 
an inability to generate adaptive mental imagery may make a significantly negative 
contribution to interpretation bias and to the hopelessness that characterizes depression. 
Therefore, according to Lang et al. (2012), repeated practice in generating adaptive 
imagery in response to ambiguous stimuli is particularly applicable to the treatment of 
depression. An additional benefit of imagery-based training is that the auditory 
presentation of vignettes is conducive for maintaining participant interest and 
concentration. 
Blackwell and Holmes (2010) investigated CBM targeting interpretation via 
positive mental imagery in depression. In this study, which used a single case series 
design, seven depressed individuals (currently experiencing a depressive episode) 
completed a one-week CBM training in which they received daily doses of training. 
Results indicated participants experienced significant improvement in depressive 
symptoms, cognitive bias, and general mental health. Furthermore, the improvements in 
depressive symptoms were maintained at two-week follow up. 
Lang et al. (2012) used a novel training procedure that combined auditory and 
written CBM-I training materials. Participants currently experiencing a major depressive 
episode completed daily training sessions for one week. This study found that among the 
participants that received positive imagery CBM-I, everyday use of imagery and ability 
to generate positive mental imagery at baseline differentiated responders and non-
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responders. Based on these findings, the researchers suggest it may be important to 
provide participants with additional training on imagery, prior to CBM training. Torkan 
et al. (2014), incorporated this suggestion in a study that examined the importance 
imagery instructions during CBM training for treatment-seeking individuals with major 
depression in outpatient psychiatry clinics in Iran. This study included additional training 
in imagery use prior to the CBM-I protocol. During this training, participants in the 
imagery condition were given brief practice in a task that asked them to imagine cutting a 
lemon followed by practice with four sample vignettes emphasizing the use of a field 
perspective. This study found that individuals in the imagery condition demonstrated 
reduced symptoms of depression and negative interpretive bias as compared to the no-
imagery condition. 
A study by Williams, Blackwell, Mackenzie, Holmes, and Andrews (2013) 
evaluated both the independent effects of a CBM protocol targeting imagery (see 
Blackwell & Holmes, 2010) and interpretation bias and the combined effects of CBM-I 
followed by internet based cognitive behavioral therapy (iCBT) in participants diagnosed 
with a major depressive episode. Results suggest that internet-delivered CBM-I for 
depression can effect symptom reduction. In addition, results demonstrate the feasibility 








 The study by Miller et al. (2015) served as a starting point for the present study 
because this study provided promising initial evidence that big picture thinking can be 
trained using CBM-I and that such training may have benefits for emotional reactivity. 
The present study sought to extend these findings in the following ways: by targeting a 
depression vulnerable sample; by including repeated CBM-I sessions over the course of a 
week; by enhancing training by emphasizing imagery and including auditory items; and 
by including a two-week follow-up session and a three-month follow-up session. 
 The study compared an individually administered CBM-I big picture appraisal 
intervention with a control condition that encouraged a personal appraisal style 
(described below). Measures were administered during a pre-test session (Session 1), 
followed by a post-test, one week later at the end of the final training session (Session 6), 
a two-week follow-up and a 3-month follow-up. After completing pre-intervention 
measures, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: Big Picture 
or Personal Appraisal Control. Between pre-test (Session 1) and post-test (Session 6), 
participants received four training sessions (Sessions 2-5) described in more detail below. 
The pre-test session (Session 1) was completed in person in a computer lab. All other 
sessions were completed via computer from locations chosen by participants. See Table 1 




Study Aims and Hypotheses 
 
 The first aim of the study was to determine whether participants in the big picture 
condition demonstrated generalization of big picture thinking. It was hypothesized that 
the intervention group as compared to the personal appraisal control group would: (1a) 
provide more big picture interpretations of novel, ambiguous vignettes at post-test 
(Session 6); (1b) form more big picture sentences on a Scrambled Sentence Test of big 
picture appraisal (SST-BPA) at post-test (Session 6); (1c) demonstrate higher scores on 
the Big Picture Questionnaire at post-test (Session 6).  
 The second study aim was to examine whether the big picture condition and the 
personal appraisal control condition would differ on measures related to depression. 
Following this, it was predicted that the intervention group as compared to the personal 
appraisal control group would:  (2a) show less negative mood and more positive mood in 
response to the RAT stressor task at posttest (Session 6); (2b) show lower scores on the 
CES-D at posttest (Session 6) as well as at both follow-up periods; (2c) show lower 
scores on the RRS at post-test (Session 6)  as well as both follow-up periods; (2d) show 
less depressive symptomology as indexed by the SCID-RV at the three-month follow-up. 
Participants 
 
 The study recruited adults vulnerable to depression, as indexed by their having a 
history of depression, but not meeting criteria for a depression diagnosis at the time of the 
study. A G-Power analysis (Faul, Erfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was conducted to 
determine appropriate sample size to obtain a medium effect size of .25, and a power 
level of .95 with an alpha level of .01. It was determined that 54 participants were needed 
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for the study. Volunteers were recruited via advertisements on Craigslist, posts on 
Facebook, and utilization of email list serves. Characteristics of the sample are described 
under Results and in Table 2. 
Potential participants completed a phone screen to establish eligibility for the 
study. Inclusion criteria were: (1) experienced a recent depressive episode (within the last 
5 years) based on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM 5 Disorders SCID-RV; (2) 
remission for at least the previous 8 weeks (participants were deemed ineligible if they 
reported that at least 1 week during the previous 8 they had experienced either a core 
symptom of depression (depressed mood, anhedonia) or suicidal feelings and at least one 
other symptom of depression) (3) demonstrated fluency in the English language; (4) were 
between 18 and 70 years of age; and (5) provided informed consent. Exclusionary criteria 
included: (1) experience of a current episode of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD); (2) 
prior or current experience of a manic episode; (3) acute suicidality; (4) history of 
psychosis, (5) diagnosis of dyslexia (due to the amount of reading involved in the study),  
(6) current abuse of alcohol or other substances; (7) diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder; (8) diagnosis of an eating disorder; (9) new psychiatric medication or dose 
changes within the two weeks prior to starting the study, or (10) changes in 




 The CBM-I training given to both conditions included a written component and 
an auditory component (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010), both described below. Both 
components included a series of vignettes. The vignettes consisted of 3-5 sentences that 
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described personally relevant scenarios involving common situations such as gatherings 
with friends, dates, and attending classes (examples provided below). Scenarios were 
designed such that their potential outcome (big picture vs personal appraisal control) only 
became clear at the end of the vignette (Clarke et al., 2014). In the big picture training 
condition, every training vignette resolved with a big picture ending, whereas in the 
personal appraisal control condition, the vignettes resolved with an ending that 
encouraged a personal appraisal. The nature of items in both conditions will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
 The aim of the study was to change participants’ way of thinking rather than to 
simply produce positive mood. In addition, it was important to avoid inadvertently 
training a bias to expect only negative events. To address these concerns, some of the 
vignettes were neutral in valence and the rest were evenly split between those that were 
negative in valence (describing adverse events) and those that were positive in valence 
(describing fortunate events).  
For both written and auditory items, participants were instructed to “imagine the 
scenarios as if you are actively involved, seeing them through your own eyes.” To focus 
participants on appropriately generating imagery, participants were periodically asked to 
provide a rating of vividness of their imagery (‘How vividly could you imagine the 
situation that was described?”) on a 5-point (1-5) scale ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very’ 
(Holmes et al., 2006).  These imagery ratings were collected twice within every set of 8 
vignettes. Training sessions included a mix of written and auditory vignettes.  
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Nature of the training conditions. Below is a detailed discussion of the 
characteristics of the items within each condition. 
Big picture condition. In creating items for the big picture condition, the multiple 
dimensions of big picture thinking were considered. Recall these dimensions include: (1) 
an extended time perspective which includes an awareness of how emotional states 
fluctuate and distress tends to dissipate with time; (2) the broader context of one’s life 
goals; and (3) the broader human context, in which human wants and needs are 
fundamentally similar, and distress and fallibility are universal. While these dimensions 
inspired items generally, there were items that did not fall neatly into one specific 
category. Nevertheless, all big picture vignettes were thought to reflect an appraisal that 
considers a wider perspective.  A sampling of vignettes from the big picture condition are 
provided below. Both positive and negative items are given. 
Example 1: Negative Valence 
Recently, you got into an argument with your brother. You decide to break the ice 
 by dropping by his house. While hanging out, you have a long and rather intense 
 conversation together. Afterwards, as you are headed home you think about how 
 (time often heals conflict). 
 
Example 4: Positive Valence 
You invite some friends over for dinner and spend several hours cleaning your 
 place and preparing the meal. The conversation is lively and interesting—
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 everyone seems to find lots to talk about. Drinking coffee afterwards, you think 
 (deep down all people are alike). 
 
Personal appraisal control condition. A personal appraisal style is one in which 
both positive and negative occurrences are attributed to characteristics of oneself. This 
control was adapted from a control condition used by Watkins et al. (2008). Watkins et al. 
developed an abstract, verbal-analytical, evaluative condition thought to reflect 
depressive rumination, which they called the DR condition (depressive rumination 
condition). This DR condition had participants focus on the causes, meanings, and 
consequences of their feelings. A version of this control was also used by Miller et al. 
(2015). Upon examining the DR items from the Watkins et al. (2008) study and the 
personal appraisal items from the Miller et al. (2015) study, it was noted that many of the 
items seemed too negative in tone. Given the vulnerable sample in the present study as 
well as the idea that the personal appraisal control was not intended to induce negative 
mood, attention was given to creating items for the present study that were not overly 
negative. To do this, some of the negative items were edited in order to be more neutral 
in nature. Additionally, a number of positive items were added so that there was an even 
split between positive and negative valence. Consider the following examples of items 
from the personal appraisal control condition. Both positive and negative items are 
provided. It should be noted that appraising items in terms of one’s personal 
characteristics often seems inherently more valenced than big picture appraisal. This will 
be apparent in the examples below. 
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Example 2: Negative Valence 
A month ago your beloved dog died from illness. The memory of how sad you 
 felt as you stroked his soft fur for the last time is still vivid. Reflecting on the loss 
 of your dog, you think (you’re a caring person). 
 
Example 1: Positive Valence 
You’ve recently gotten to know two of your coworkers that you hadn’t talked 
 much to before, and you are really enjoying the friendship. Today you all had the 
 day off so you drove to a nearby town to explore it. The weather was beautiful 
 and you had a great day. As you return home, you smile, thinking you (form good 
 relationships). 
 
Written training component. The last word or phrase of each written vignette 
provided either a big picture interpretation of the scenario at hand or a personal appraisal 
of the scenario. Participants were shown the first few sentences of the vignette (without 
the big picture or personal appraisal control ending) on an initial screen. On the next 
screen they were shown the final sentence of the vignette. In this final word or phrase, 
there was a word fragment to be completed by the participant. Completion of the word 
fragment resulted either in a big picture interpretation of the vignette (for the big picture 
condition) or in a personal interpretation of the vignette (for the control condition). 
Participants were asked to fill in the word fragment in a text box provided. A simple 
“yes/no” comprehension question followed all written vignettes. Completion of the 
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comprehension questions was intended to enhance training effects (see Hertel & 
Matthews, 2011). This training procedure follows a standard form of CBM training (e.g. 
Watkins et al., 2008, experiment 3). As mentioned previously, in order to ensure the 
training vignettes were not mood inducing, some of the vignettes in the written training 
component were positively valenced and others were negatively valenced. Following are 




The death of your cousin last month hit you hard and you haven’t felt like yourself lately. 
After a week in which you felt especially emotional you decide to spend some time 
writing in your journal.  
 
Second screen: 
As you write, you reflect upon how (_ll people experience painful losses) [all, Big 
Picture ]/ (you are a deep, tho_ghtful person) [thoughtful, Personal Appraisal Control]. 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Are you alone in your grief? YES/NO (Big Picture) 






You have gotten to know a co-worker better recently and find you really enjoy each 
others’company. One day you have lunch with this person and have a fascinating 
conversation about how you each see life.  
 
Second screen: 
At the end of the meal, your co-worker comments that the way you approach things is 




Does your co-worker think you share things in common with many people? YES/NO 
(Big Picture) 
 
Does your co-worker find you intelligent? YES/NO (Personal Appraisal Control) 
 
Auditory training component. Each training session also included vignettes that 
were presented in an auditory fashion. These vignettes were digitally recorded and lasted 
10 to 13 seconds. Vignettes were designed such that their resolution (big picture or 
personal appraisal control) only became clear in the final word or phrase of the vignettes, 
after a short pause in the narration. Like the written vignettes, the auditory items were 
followed by comprehension questions. Examples of positively and negatively valenced 




Positive valence:  
 You just received your annual evaluation at work. The company had a tough 
 year, and you worked really hard. As you look at the evaluation, you are 
 pleased to see that it is better than you had hoped. You enjoy your success, 
 thinking that 
(short pause)… 
  ….(life has moments to s_vor) /[savor, big picture](you are really 




 Are you seeing the big picture? YES/NO 
 
 Are you good at your job? YES/NO 
 
Negative valence: 
 On your way to an appointment one morning, you can’t remember whether you 
locked your front door. You are in a rush, so you decide not to go back and check. 
When you get home, you find that someone has been in your house. It looks like 
they only managed to take a couple things of low value. After calling the police, 
you remind yourself…  
(short pause) 
 …(this could have been worse) [Big Picture] / (you are usually very careful) 




Were you fortunate in some ways? YES/NO [Big Picture] 
 
Do you usually take care when locking up your home? YES/NO [Personal 
Appraisal Control] 
Generalization of Training Task: Similarity Ratings Test  
In order to test for the generalization of training, a similarity ratings task was used. 
This task was based on a common procedure in CBM-I work (e.g. Watkins et al., 2008). 
Training vignettes were followed by a set of 18 new test-vignettes, each headed with a 
brief identifying title. Each test-vignette included a word fragment and was followed by a 
comprehension question. The resolution of the new vignettes was left ambiguous (i.e. did 
not encourage a big picture or personal interpretation). An example follows: 
  
The gossip 
 One morning you are at school having coffee with some of your co-workers. You 
 tell them a juicy piece of gossip about one of your peers. Suddenly the person you 
 are talking about appears at the door. You aren’t certain how much they’ve heard 
 but you realize you were not being careful and reflect with regret on your actio_s 
 [actions]. 
 Are you drinking tea?  Yes/No 
 After participants completed a short buffer task, consisting of ten easy true/false 
questions, they read the identifying title of each generalization test-vignette, followed by 
three versions of the final sentence, reflecting a personal appraisal-, a big picture-, or an 
irrelevant- interpretation of the vignette. Participants were told that none of the endings 
were identical to those in the original vignette, but that one was most similar in meaning 
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to the original. Participants were instructed to rank the answer choices according to which 
ending of the scenario was most similar to the one they previously read.  Participants 
gave the option they thought was most similar to the original ending a “1”, the option 
they thought was the next most similar a “2” and so on. An example follows: 
The gossip 
 (a) Suddenly this co-worker appears at the door, and you regret this mistake that is 
so easy for people to make (big picture). 
 (b) Suddenly this co-worker appears at the door, and you regret your social 
 incompetence (personal appraisal control). 
 (c) Suddenly this co-worker appears at the door, and you realize that you were so  
 surprised you spilled your coffee (irrelevant). 
To indicate that training generalized to this task, participants in the big picture 
intervention condition were expected to rank the big picture interpretation of the 
ambiguous scenario as the most similar, and so on.  
Measures and Tasks 
 
Remote Associations Task (RAT). The RAT was used successfully to induce 
negative mood by Watkins (2004), Hunt (1998), McFarlin and Blascovich (1984), and 
Brown and Dutton (1995). In the present study, the task was described to participants as a 
measure of intelligence. Participants were given 15 very difficult items. Each item 
consisted of a set of three words (e.g. bass, complex, sleep), all of which share a fourth 
word as a common associate (deep). The task was to supply the fourth word. Participants 
had 30 s to complete each item.   
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The RAT was administered at posttest (Session 6) in order to detect differences in 
emotional reactivity between the intervention group and the personal appraisal control 
group. PANAS mood scores measured after the first and second administration of the 
RAT for both groups will be compared. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM 5 Disorders (SCIDV-RV). The 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-V Axis I Disorders is a semi-structured interview 
for making the major DSM-V Axis I diagnoses. Previous work has found evidence to 
support the psychometric properties of the SCID (Lobbestael & Leurgans, 2011). 
In the present study, the SCID-RV was used to determine eligibility for the study. 
It was also administered at the three-month follow-up in order to assess for depression 
symptomology. Inter-rater reliability for the SCID-RV was 100% in the present study. 
Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA; Haner et al., 
2013, May). This measure of Big Picture Appraisal was modeled after an established 
measure of depressive cognitive biases, the SST (Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, 
& Maestas, 2010; Wenzlaff; 1988, 1993; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweat, 2001). 
A number of recent CBM studies have used the SST as a measure of altered cognitive 
biases (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Yiend et al., 2014). As in the original SST, items 
developed for the SST-BPA were groups of 6 words (e.g., “temporary is bad think pain 
I”) that respondents unscramble by placing numbers above each word to reflect the 
chosen word ordering (e.g., “I think pain is temporary” or “I think pain is bad”).  Items 
(e.g., “me every like no feels person”) were constructed to allow formation of sentences 
judged consistent with BPA (e.g., “Every person feels like me”) or inconsistent with BPA 
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(e.g., “No person feels like me”). Three studies conducted by Haner & Rude (2015) 
provide preliminary support for the reliability and validity of the SST-BPA. 
Two sets of seven sentences (14 total) were presented for two minutes per set. To 
further decrease the use of volitional control on responding, items were administered 
under cognitive load (maintaining a 6-digit number in memory while completing the 
items). The SST-BPA was administered at pretest (Session 1) and posttest (Session 6) 
Inter-rater reliability for the SST-BPA was 100% in the present study. 
Positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS consists of two 10-item scales measuring positive affect (e.g., 
“enthusiastic”, “excited”, “proud”) and negative affect (e.g., “distressed,” “hostile,” 
“scared”). Each item is rated for the extent to which the participant feels that way right 
now on a 5—point scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The PANAS 
was used to examine emotional reactivity following the RAT stressor task. Therefore, it 
was administered twice during Session 6, once before the RAT and once after the RAT. 
The PANAS was also administered at pretest (Session 1), the two-week follow-up, and 
the three-month follow-up. 
The PANAS has been found to be a reliable (Positive Affect: α=0.86-0.90; 
Negative Affect: α=0.84-0.87) and valid measure of mood (Watson et al., 1988). Internal 
consistency for the PANAS Positive Affect scale and Negative Affect scale in the present 
study was good (Positive Affect Pre-Stressor: α=0.91, Positive Affect Post-Stressor: 
α=0.92; Negative Affect Pre-Stressor: α=0.91; Negative Affect Post-Stressor: α=.92).  
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Ruminative Response Scale- 10 item version (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) asks respondents to rate 
how frequently they react to depressed mood with ruminative thoughts, symptoms, or 
consequences of the depressive mood (e.g., ‘‘think ‘I won’t be able to do my job/work 
because I feel so badly’”). The items are scored 1 (Never), to 4 (Almost Always). The 
RRS was administered at pretest (Session 1), posttest (Session 6), at the two-week 
follow-up session, and at the three-month follow-up session. 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) have reported good internal consistency (α 
= .89) and predictive validity. Internal consistency for the RRS in the present study was 
good (Session 1/Pretest: α=0.76; Session 6/Post-test: α=.79; 2-week follow-up: α=0.78; 
3-month follow-up: α=0.73). 
The Centers for Epidemiological Studies- Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977) is a widely utilized instrument that consists of twenty items designed to measure 
depressive symptomatology in the general population. Respondents are asked to indicate 
the frequency of symptoms on a scale ranging from 0 (Rarely or none of the time) to 3 
(Most of the time). Radloff suggested a threshold score of 16 for the indication of 
clinically significant depression. The CES-D was administered at pretest (Session 1), 
posttest (Session 6), at the two-week follow-up session, and at the three-month follow-up 
session. 
Internal consistency using coefficient alpha is estimated to be .85 for the 
community samples and .90 in clinical samples (Radloff, 1977). Internal consistency for 
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the CES-D in the present study was good (Session 1/Pretest: α=0.73; Session 6/Post-test: 
α=.81; 2-week follow-up: α=0.84; 3-month follow-up: α=0.78). 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1989 a). The 
VVIQ consists of 16 items separated into four groups of 4 items in which the participant 
is invited to consider the image formed in thinking about specific scenes and situations. 
Subjects twice rate (once with eyes open, once with eyes closed) the vividness of their 
imagery on a five-point scale (with lower numbers indicating higher vividness). In the 
present study, the VVIQ was administered at pretest (Session 1). The VVIQ has been 
found to be a valid and reliable measure (Marks, 1989). Internal consistency for the 
VVIQ in the present study was good (α=.92). 
Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire (BPQ) (Rude et al., May 2013). The 
instructions ask respondents to think back to situations in which they have been upset or 
unhappy and to characterize the way they usually respond in such situations by rating 
each of the 23 items on a 5-point scale, ranging from “never” to “very frequently.”. Items 
are included tapping each of the three dimensions reported here (e.g., extended time 
perspective: “I remind myself that if I wait it out I will eventually feel better;” broader 
context of life and self: “I realize that this is only part of who I am;” and broader human 
context: “I know that others experience feelings like mine.”). In several samples, the BPQ 
has shown good internal consistency and convergent-discriminant validity (Gill et al., 
2013, Gill, Miller, Rude, & Haner, in press). The BPQ was administered at pretest 
(Session 1) and posttest (Session 6). Internal consistency of the BPQ in the present study 
was good (Pre-Test/Session 1: α=.94; Post-Test/Session 6: α=.96). 
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Procedure: Session by Session Breakdown (also see Table 1 and Figure 1) 
 
Session 1 (pretest; approximate time: 60 minutes). This session took place in 
person. Prior to beginning session 1, researchers completed the portion of the SCID that 
was not completed over the phone. This part of the SCID involves questions regarding 
suicidality, therefore, we decided to ask these questions in person so that the appropriate 
referrals and resources could be provided to participants.  
 Upon completion of the SCID, participants were directed to begin Session 1 of 
the study which was administered primarily online. Once participants followed the link to 
Session 1 (administered using Qualtrics survey software) they were randomly assigned to 
either the big picture condition or the personal appraisal control condition. Participants in 
both conditions began by completing pre-test measures (Scrambled Sentence Task, 
Positive Negative Affect Scale, Ruminative Response Scale, Center for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression Scale, Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, Big Picture 
Questionnaire).  
Next, participants were guided through a brief imagery training in which they 
were asked to imagine cutting a lemon in order to clarify what is meant by “using mental 
imagery” (see Lang et al., 2012). They then practiced four sample descriptions with a 
particular emphasis on using imagery from field perspective, and not using observer 
imagery or verbal processing (Torkan, Blackwell, Holmes, Kalantari, Doost, & Maroufi, 
2014). It should be noted that the imagery training was done by the researcher, verbally 
with the participants. After imagery training, participants were redirected to the online 
survey. After completing practice training items, participants in both conditions were 
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given stimuli from both auditory and written CBM components (8 auditory vignettes; 8 
written vignettes). The aim of the first session was to familiarize participants with the 
study and prepare them for the training tasks ahead.   
Sessions 2-5 (training sessions; approximate time: 20 minutes each). 
Participants completed sessions 2-5 via computer at locations of their choosing. 
Participants were sent emails with the links to these sessions and were encouraged to 
complete each subsequent session within 48 hours from the time they completed the 
previous session. Sessions 2-5 each included 40 training scenarios (32 written items; 8 
auditory items).  The items were presented in blocks of eight. In each of these sessions 
participants completed 3 blocks of written items, followed by one block of auditory items, 
and finished with a final block of written items. The estimated time for completion of 
sessions 2-5 was about 20 minutes per session.  
Session 6 (posttest; approximate time: 60 minutes). After completing sessions 
2-5, participants were sent an email with a link to session 6. In this session, participants 
completed a final round of training (8 written items; 8 auditory items). After this, they 
completed the transfer similarity ratings task, the RAT stressor, and then the posttest 
measures (Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire, PANAS, Scrambled Sentence Test, 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale, Ruminative Response Scale). The 
RAT stressor task was meant to induce a sense of disappointment in participants. 
Participants were informed that the task is a measure of their intelligence when in fact the 
task is made up of very difficult items. Participants were debriefed about the RAT and 
informed about this deception upon conclusion of the study. 
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Two-week follow-up (approximate time: 15 minutes). At the two-week follow-
up, participants completed the RRS, and the CES-D via computer from a location of their 
choosing. 
Three-month follow-up (approximate time: 15 minutes).  The three-month 
follow-up consisted of an online component as well as an interview component. In the 
online session participants completed the RRS and the CES-D.  During the telephone 
interview, participants were given the SCID-IV to assess for depressive symptomology. 
Finally, participants were asked open-ended questions that encouraged them to reflect on 
























Study Sessions and Activities 
Session Procedures 
Session 1 (pre-test) Pretest measures (SST-BPA, PANAS, RRS, 
CES-D, VVIQ, BPQ), imagery training, 
initial training items specific to condition (8 
written, 8 auditory) 
Sessions 2-5 (training sessions) CBM training specific to condition (3 sets of 
8 written, 1 set of 8 auditory, 1 set of 8 
written) 
Session 6 (post-test) training items specific to condition (8 written, 
8 auditory), similarities ratings task, RAT 
stressor, post-test measures (SST-BPA, 
PANAS, RRS, CES-D, BPQ) 
Two-week follow-up  Complete RRS, CES-D, PANAS 
3 month follow-up  Complete RRS, CES-D 
Note: SST-BPA (Scrambled Sentences Test-Big Picture Appraisal); PANAS (Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule); RRS (Ruminative Response Scale); CES-D (Center for 
Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale); VVIQ (Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire); RAT (Remote Associations Task); SCID (Structured Clinical Interview 





Chapter 4:  
Results 
 
 There were two primary aims in the present study. The first aim was to examine 
whether big picture thinking could be trained using cognitive bias modification for 
interpretation and if so, to examine the extent to which training in big picture thinking 
would generalize to other tasks. Specific hypotheses predicted that participants in the big 
picture condition would: 1a) endorse more big picture interpretations of novel vignettes 
on the similarity ratings task as compared to the personal appraisal control group; 1b) 
form more big picture sentences at posttest on the scrambled sentences task as compared 
to the personal appraisal control group; and 1c) score higher on the Big Picture 
Questionnaire at posttest as compared to the personal appraisal control group. The second 
aim of the study was to examine whether the big picture condition and the personal 
appraisal control condition would differ on measures of stress reactivity, depression, and 
rumination. Specific hypotheses predicted that participants in the big picture group 
would: 2a) endorse less negative mood and more positive mood in response to a stressor 
task as compared to the personal appraisal control condition; 2b) endorse less depression 
at posttest and both the 2-week follow-up session and three-month follow-up session as 
compared to the personal appraisal control group; and 2c) endorse less rumination at 
posttest and both the 2-week follow-up session and the three-month follow-up session as 
compared to the personal appraisal control group; 2d) endorse less depressive 
symptomology on the SCID-RV interview at the 3-month follow-up as compared to the 
personal appraisal control condition. 
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 It should be noted, that the three-month follow-up (which relates to hypotheses 2b, 
2c, and 2d) data was analyzed separately because it has only been possible to collect data 
from 42 out of the 53 participants. The results from this data are reported in a separate 
section at the end of this results chapter.  
Analytic Strategy 
 
 Data were analyzed using the IBM Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 23. Variables were checked for the assumptions of parametric testing prior to 
applying statistical tests. Outliers were identified by visual inspection of box plots and 
examination of z scores and some analyses were conducted both with and without cases 
identified as potential outliers. The alpha level was set at .05 for significance tests. 
 Independent samples t-tests and mixed model repeated measures ANOVAs were 
used to test hypotheses. In the case of the mixed model ANOVAS, hypotheses were 
tested using measurements taken at two or more time points and were analyzed using 
time as the within-participants variable and group as the between-participants variable.   
Characteristics of the Sample 
 Through the SCID screening interview, it was determined that 60 participants 
qualified for the study. As shown in Figure 1, three participants dropped out between the 
time of the screening interview and Session 1. An additional four participants dropped 
out after being assigned to a condition (Personal Appraisal Control=3, Big Picture=1). Of 
these four participants, one control participant dropped out after Session 1, one big 
picture participant after Session 2, one control participant after Session 3, and one control 
participant after Session 5. The participants that dropped out (7 in total) belonged to the 
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following demographic categories: male=5, female=2, Caucasian=3, Non-White=4, some 
college=5, completed college=2, English Speaking=7. 
 The final sample consisted of 52 participants, 27 in the big picture condition and 
25 in the personal appraisal control condition. One participant in the big picture condition 
was excluded from analyses due to a particularly large delay (35 days) in completing 
sessions. This represented an outlying value (z score > 3) since the mean number of days 
participants took to complete sessions was 14 days.  Baseline characteristics of 
participants in the big picture and personal appraisal control conditions were compared 
using two-tailed independent samples t-tests or chi-square tests of independence (See 
Table 2). Of note, the chi-square test assumes an expected cell frequency of 5. Therefore, 
categories were collapsed as needed to meet this assumption and are specified in Table 2. 
For racial group, participants identified as the following: White, Latino, Asian, Multi-
Racial, or Black. In order to obtain appropriate cell counts, participants were collapsed 
into white and non-white categories. While it is not assumed that there is a common 
experience for these non-white ethnic/racial groups, there may be some commonality in 
not being a member of the dominant racial/ethnic group. Therefore it was important to 
determine whether white and non-white participants were balanced across conditions.  
For the education variable, participants identified as: completing some college, obtaining 
a bachelor’s degree, or obtaining a graduate degree. In order to obtain necessary cell 
counts, participants were collapsed into those that had not yet completed college and 
those that had completed college. The chi-square test for Language (English as first 
language v. English as second language) was not possible due to there only being 4 
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participants in each condition for whom English was the second language. Raw data are 
provided for the Language category. It is worth noting, all participants who indicated 
English is their second language also reported a high level of fluency with English. As 
shown in the table, participants in both groups were comparable on demographic 
characteristics.  
Table 2 




 Group Statistic p 







Sociodemographics     
Age 23.29 (6.56) 21.96 (3.29) t=.94 ns 
Ethnicity (White 
vs. Non-White) 
13 White; 5 
Latino; 6 
Asian; 2 Multi-
Racial; 1 Black 
10 White; 2 
Latino; 9 
Asian; 3 Multi-
racial; 1 Black 
χ2= .53  ns 
Gender  19 female; 8 
male 















χ2= .31 ns 












 Pretest variables were also examined. As shown in Table 3, groups were 
comparable at baseline on all pretest variables except the Center for Epidemiological 
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Studies Depression scale (CES-D) and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale-Negative 
Affect (PANAS-NA). These pretest differences are surprising given that groups were 
randomly assigned by the Qualtrics survey software program. Due to these pretest 
differences, results should be interpreted with caution.  
Table 3 
Participant means on pretest measures by group with standard deviations in parentheses 






Pretest measures     
CES-D 43.78 (9.27) 35.88 (7.33) t= 3.40 p< .01 
RRS 24.00 (4.68) 22.12 (5.34) t= 1.35 ns 
BPQ 62.37 (17.2) 63.84 (17.77) t= -.303 ns 
VVIQ 36.07 (8.16) 37.48 (15.24) t= -.410 ns 
PANAS-Positive 
Affect 
24.37 (9.39) 24.84 (7.67) t= -.197 ns 
PANAS-Negative 
Affect 
18.07 (6.96) 14.48 (5.25) t= 2.09 p=.04 
SST-BPA 
big picture 
7.74 (3.48) 7.48 (2.99) t= .289 ns 
Note: CES-D (Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale); RRS (Ruminative 
Response Scale); BPQ (Big Picture Questionnaire); VVIQ (Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire); PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule); SST-BPA (Scrambles 
Sentences Test-Big Picture Appraisal) 
 
 Table 4 provides the intercorrelations of pretest study variables. Significant 
positive interrelationships were found between the CES-D, PANAS-negative affect, 
ERQ-suppression (p  < .01 for all bivariate relationships). Positive interrelationships were 
also found between the RRS and PANAS-negative affect (p < .05), between the BPQ, 
PANAS-positive affect (p < .05), ERQ-reappraisal (p < .05), and SST –big picture (p < 
.01), between the PANAS-positive affect and ERQ-reappraisal (p < .05), between 
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PANAS-negative affect and ERQ-suppression (p < .01) and between the ERQ-reappraisal 
and the SST-big picture (p < .05). Significant negative intercorrelations were found 
between the CES-D and BPQ (p < .01),  the CES-D and PANAS-positive affect (p < .05), 
and the CES-D and  SST-big picture (p < .01). Additionally, significant negative 
correlations were found between the PANAS-negative affect and the SST-big picture (p < 
.01) as well as between the ERQ-suppression and SST-big picture (p < .05). All 
intercorrelations were in the expected directions. 
Table 4 
Intercorrelations of pretest Study Variables  
Study 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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1. CES-D 1 .46** -.36** .20 -.30* .54** .42** -.22 -.42** 
2. RRS    1 .02 .02 .07 .23* .14 .16 -.15 
3. BPQ     1 -.18 .33* -.27 -.24 .55* .41** 








          1 .36** -.22 -.42** 
7. ERQ-
suppression 
            1 -.12 -.27* 
8. ERQ-
reappraisal 
              1 .23* 
9. SST-big 
picture 
                1 
Note: **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant 
at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Examination of Hypotheses 
 Testing Generalization of Treatment. Recall the first aim of the study was to 
test whether big picture thinking could be trained using cognitive bias modification for 
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interpretation and if so, to examine the extent to which training in big picture thinking 
transferred to other measures that varied in their similarity to the training task. The results 
of each hypothesis test are discussed below. 
 Hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1a was that participants in the big picture condition 
would form more big-picture interpretations of novel vignettes on the similarity ratings 
task as compared to the personal appraisal control group. Recall that the similarity ratings 
task consisted of 18 vignettes, presented at the conclusion of training (Session 6). 
Participants in both conditions saw identical vignettes. Unlike training vignettes, which 
ended in either a big picture or personal interpretation, the similarity ratings task 
vignettes ended ambiguously. After reading through the similarity ratings task vignettes 
and then completing a short buffer task, participants were asked to complete an incidental 
recognition test. They were given the title of each similarity ratings task vignette along 
with three potential interpretations (one big picture, one personal appraisal control, one 
irrelevant) which they were asked to rank according to which most accurately reflected 
the ending in the previously read vignettes (1=best interpretation, 2=next best 
interpretation, etc.). It was hypothesized that participants in the big picture condition 
would give significantly more “1” ratings to the big picture endings on the similarity 
ratings task.   
 To test this hypothesis, a proportion score was calculated by taking the number of 
big picture interpretations given a ranking of “1” by each participant and dividing by the 
total number of transfer vignettes (18). Before conducting an independent samples t-test 
to examine differences, assumptions for this test were assessed. There were no significant 
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outliers in the proportion scores. Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant 
(p<.05). Therefore Welch’s two sample t-test was used. Skewness and kurtosis values 
indicated there was no violation of normality.  
 An independent samples t-test comparing proportion scores between the two 
groups showed that participants in the big picture condition chose significantly more big 
picture interpretations of the novel vignettes (M= .57, SD= .27) as compared to the 
personal appraisal control condition (M=.39, SD=.13); t (38.78) = 2.98. p< 0.01. See 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
Group Means for Similarity Ratings Task Big Picture Proportion Scores 
 
Note. Bars representing standard error depicted on graph. 
 
 An identical analysis was done to test whether participants in the personal 
appraisal condition would form more personal appraisal interpretations of novel vignettes 














Group Means for Similarity Ratings Task  
Big Picture Proportion Scores 
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assessed. It was determined that there were no outliers. Levene’s test for equality of 
variances was significant (p<.05). Therefore Welch’s two sample t-test was used. Finally, 
skewness and kurtosis values indicated the assumption of normality was met. An 
independent samples t-test comparing proportion scores between the two groups showed 
that participants in the personal appraisal condition chose significantly more personal 
appraisal interpretations of the novel vignettes (M= .57, SD= .13) as compared to the big 
picture condition (M=.40, SD=.24); t (32.94) = -3.0, p< 0.01. 
 Hypothesis 1b. Hypothesis 1b was that participants in the big picture condition 
would form significantly more big picture sentences on the Scrambled Sentences-Big 
Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA) at posttest as compared to the personal appraisal control 
group. Recall that the Scrambled Sentences Task required participants to unscramble sets 
of 6 words to form 5-word sentences. This was done under time pressure (two minutes to 
complete seven sentences) and under cognitive load (participants were asked to 
remember a 7-digit number). Sentences could be unscrambled to form a big picture 
sentence or a non-big picture sentence.  In preparation for analysis, sentences formed by 
participants were coded by two independent raters. Raters coded the sentences as “1” if 
they reflected a big picture sentence and “0” if they did not reflect a big picture sentence. 
Ungrammatical sentences were not coded. In order to assess inter-rater reliability, a third 
coder identified seven cases and recoded all sentences with perfect agreement. 
 To test hypothesis 1b, proportion scores were calculated for each participant at 
each time point (pretest/Session 1 and posttest/Session 6).  These proportion scores were 
created by taking the number of big picture sentences formed by each participant divided 
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by the total number of sentences (big picture and non big picture) formed by each 
participant. A mixed model repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on these SST 
proportion scores, with one within-participants factor, Time (pretest/Session 1, 
posttest/Session 6) and one between-participants factor, Condition (big picture, control). 
Prior to testing, assumptions of mixed model ANOVA were assessed. There were no 
significant outliers in the proportion scores. Additionally, Levene’s Test for equality of 
variances indicated this assumption was met. Skewness and kurtosis values indicated 
there was no violation of normality.  
 Results showed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 50)=5.19, p=0.03, partial 
eta squared = .09, and a significant group by time interaction F(1, 50)=5.32, p=0.03, 
partial eta squared= .10. The time main effect was such that overall, means on the SST 
increased significantly from pretest to posttest. Visual inspection of the plots and 
examination of means for both groups suggests that participants in the two conditions 
were not significantly different at pretest (control: M=.66, SD=.05; big picture: M=.67, 
SD=.05), however, participants in the big picture condition formed significantly more big 
picture sentences at posttest (M=.77, SD=.05) than the personal appraisal control group 









Group Means Across Time for Scrambled Sentence Proportion Scores
 
Note. Time 1 refers to SST proportion scores at pretest (Session 1); Time 2 refers to SST 









































Transfer Task (% BP) .57 (.27) .39 (.13) 
SST (%BP)   
Pretest (Session 1) .67 (.05) .66 (.05) 
Posttest (Session 6) .77 (.05) .67 (.05) 
BPQ   
Pretest (Session 1) 62.4 (17.2) 63.8 (17.8) 
Posttest (Session 6) 67.9 (18.8) 71.3 (19.9) 
PANAS-negative affect   
Session 1 16.6 (6.3) 14.5 (5.2) 
Session 6, pre-stressor 16.0 (6.2) 14.7 (4.3) 
Session 6, post-stressor 18.9 (7.3) 18.1 (6.1) 
2-week follow-up 14.2 (4.4) 13.8 (3.9) 
PANAS-positive affect   
Session 1 23.5 (8.4) 24.8 (7.7) 
Session 6, pre-stressor 23.6 (7.6) 23.6 (8.1) 
Session 6, post-stressor 19.9 (8.3) 19.8 (7.6) 
2-week follow-up 23.2 (9.0) 23.2 (8.4) 
CES-D   
Pretest (Session 1) 42.8 (8.1) 35.9 (7.3) 
Posttest (Session 6) 42.0 (8.9) 37.3 (7.6) 
2-week follow-up 41.2 (9.4) 36.6 (8.4) 
3-month follow-up (N=42) 39.1 (9.2) 36.0 (9.4) 
RRS   
Pretest (Session 1) 24.0 (4.7) 22.1 (5.3) 
Posttest (Session 6) 24.7 (4.8) 23.2 (5.7) 
2-week follow-up 23.7 (4.7) 21.4 (5.1) 
3-month follow-up (N=42) 22.5 (4.3) 21.0 (4.6) 
 
 Hypothesis 1c. Hypothesis 1c was that participants in the big picture condition 
would score significantly higher on the Big Picture Questionnaire at posttest as compared 
to the personal appraisal control condition. Before conducting statistical tests, parametric 
testing assumptions were assessed and no violations were identified. A mixed model 
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ANOVA was conducted on these BPQ scores with one within-participants factor, Time 
(pretest/Session 1 and posttest/Session 6) and one between-participants factor, Condition 
(big picture, control). Results showed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 50)=12.27, 
p<0.01, partial eta squared=.20, indicating scores on the Big Picture Questionnaire 
increased significantly for both the big picture and control conditions. There was no 
significant group main effect nor was there a significant group by time interaction. See 
figure 4. 
Figure 4 
Group Means Across Time for Big Picture Questionnaire Scores 
 
Note. Time 1 refers to BPQ scores at pretest (Session 1); Time 2 refers to BPQ scores at 



























 Testing Effects of Treatment. The second aim of the study was to examine 
differences between the big picture condition and the personal appraisal control condition 
in measures of stress reactivity, depression, and rumination. The results of each 
hypothesis test are discussed below. 
 Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2a was that participants in the big picture condition 
would show less emotional reactivity in response to the stressor task as compared to the 
personal appraisal control condition. Recall that the stressor was the Remote Associations 
Task (RAT), which was described to participants as a measure of intelligence. 
Participants were given 15 very difficult items. Each item consisted of a set of three 
words (e.g. bass, complex, sleep), all of which share a fourth word as a common associate 
(deep). The task was to supply the fourth word. Participants had 30 seconds to complete 
each item.  The RAT was administered during Session 6, after participants had completed 
all parts of the training in each condition. Mood was measured using the PANAS right 
before the stressor (Session 6-pre-stressor) and right after the stressor (Session 6-post-
stressor). To show less emotional reactivity, it was hypothesized that the big picture 
group would endorse less negative mood and more positive mood after the stressor, as 
compared to the personal appraisal control group. To test this, mixed model repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted on the PANAS-negative affect scores and PANAS-
positive affect scores respectively. In each analysis, there was one within participants 
factor, Time (Session 6-pre-stressor, Session 6-post-stressor) and one between-
participants factor, Condition (big picture, control).  
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 Prior to testing the PANAS-negative affect scores, assumptions of parametric 
testing were assessed. First, upon visual inspection of box plots, it was determined that 
there were two outliers during each administration of the PANAS-negative affect scale 
(pre-stressor and post-stressor). Both of these participants were outliers at both time 
points and therefore were removed from analysis. Additionally, both participants were in 
the big picture condition. The remaining sample consisted of 25 participants in the big 
picture condition and 25 participants in the personal appraisal control condition. Second, 
skewness and kurtosis values indicated there was no violation of normality.  
 Results for the PANAS-negative affect analysis showed a significant main effect 
of time, F (1, 48)=35.54, p < .011, partial eta squared= .43, such that for both groups, 
PANAS-negative affect was significantly higher at posttest as compared to pretest. There 
was no significant main effect of group nor was there a significant time by group 
interaction. These findings suggest that the stressor task was successful in increasing 







                                                
1 Results from the mixed model repeated measures ANOVA with outliers included 
showed a significant main effect of time F (1,50)=35.7, p<.01, partial eta squared=.42. 




Group Means Across Time for PANAS-Negative Affect Scores 
 
Note. Time 1 refers to PANAS-Negative Affect scores pre-stressor; Time 2 refers to 
PANAS-Negative Affect scores post-stressor. Bars representing standard error depicted 
on graph. 
 
 Before analyzing the PANAS-positive affect scale, assumptions of parametric 
testing were assessed. No outliers were identified and skewness and kurtosis values 
indicated there was no violation of normality. Levene’s test for equality of variances 
indicated this assumption was met.  
 Results for the PANAS-positive affect analysis showed a significant main effect 
of time, F (1, 50) = 34.98, p < 0.01, partial eta squared=.41, such that for both groups, 
PANAS-positive affect was significantly lower at posttest as compared to pretest. There 

























Similar to the PANAS-negative affect results, the PANAS-positive affect results suggest 
the stressor was successful in reducing positive mood, but the expected differences in 
groups were not found. See Figure 6. 
Figure 6 
Group Means Across Time for PANAS-Positive Affect Scores 
 
Note. Time 1 refers to PANAS-Positive Affect scores pre-stressor; Time 2 refers to 
PANAS-Positive Affect scores post-stressor. Bars representing standard error depicted on 
graph. 
 
 Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis 2b was that participants in the big picture condition 
would endorse less depression at posttest and the 2-week follow-up session as compared 
to the personal appraisal control group. Recall that analyses of baseline scores showed a 
significant and fairly large pre-test difference in CES-D scores between the conditions, a 

























of analyses using this variable. Nonetheless, a mixed model ANOVA was conducted on 
the CES-D scores with one within participants factor, Time (pretest, posttest, 2-week 
follow-up) and one between-subjects factor, Condition (big picture, control). 
Assumptions of parametric testing were assessed. First, upon visual inspection of box 
plots, it was determined that there was one outlier during administration of the CES-D at 
pretest. This one participant was removed for the analysis. The outlier participant was in 
the big picture condition, resulting in a sample that consisted of 26 participants in the big 
picture condition and 25 participants in the personal appraisal control condition. Second, 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality indicated normality was met during each 
administration of the CES-D. Finally the assumptions of equality of variances and 
sphericity were also met. 
 Results showed no main effect of time and no time by group interaction. There 
was a significant main effect of group F (1,49) =7.56, p = .012, partial eta squared=.13 
such that those in the big picture condition endorsed higher CES-D scores at all time 






                                                
2 Results from the mixed model repeated measures ANOVA with outliers showed no 
main effect of time and no time by group interaction. There was a significant main effect 




Group Means Across Time for CES-D Scores 
 
Note. Time 1 refers to CES-D scores at pretest (Session1); Time 2 refers to CES-D scores 
at posttest (Session 6); Time 3 refers to CES-D scores at the two-week follow-up period. 
Bars representing standard error depicted on graph. 
 
 Hypothesis 2c. Hypothesis 2c was that participants in the big picture condition 
would endorse less rumination at posttest and the 2-week follow-up session as compared 
to the personal appraisal control group. A mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the 
RRS scores with one within participants factor, Time (pretest/Session 1, posttest/Sesion 6, 
2-week follow-up) and one between-subjects factor, Condition (big picture, control). 
Assumptions of parametric testing were assessed. First, upon visual inspection of box 


























and equality of variances were met for each administration of the RRS. Finally, 
Mauchley’s Test of Sphericity indicated a violation in sphericity, therefore, Huynh-Felt 
statistics were examined in analyses.  
 Results showed no main effects of group or time and no time by group interaction. 
It should be noted, there was a trend toward a time main effect, F (2,100) =2.80, p = 0.07, 
partial eta squared=0.05 such that for both groups, RRS scores decreased over time. 
Examination of Pairwise comparisons examining the differences in RRS scores between 
each time point separately revealed a significant decrease in RRS scores occurred 

















Group Means Across Time for RRS Scores 
 
Note. Time 1 refers to RRS scores at pretest (Session1); Time 2 refers to RRS scores at 
posttest (Session 6); Time 3 refers to RRS scores at the two-week follow-up period. Bars 
representing standard error depicted on graph. 
 
Three-Month Follow-Up Data 
 The three-month follow-up data were examined separately because it has only 
been possible to collect data from 42 out of 53 participants. Of these participants, 22 were 
in the big picture condition and 20 were in the personal appraisal control condition. The 
three-month follow-up data relates to hypothesis 2b: participants in the big picture 
condition would endorse less depression at posttest and both the 2-week follow-up 



























control group; and 2c: participants in the big picture condition would endorse less 
rumination at posttest and both the 2-week follow-up session and three-month follow up 
session as compared to the personal appraisal control group. Also, recall that there was 
one hypothesis that related only to the 3-month follow-up data--hypothesis 2d: 
participants in the big picture condition would show lower levels of depressive 
symptomology as indexed by the SCID-RV at the three-month follow-up as compared to 
the personal appraisal control condition. The results for each hypothesis are discussed 
separately below.  
 Hypothesis 2b including 3-month follow-up data. Hypothesis 2b was that 
participants in the big picture condition would endorse less depression at posttest and 
both the 2-week follow-up session and the three-month follow-up session as compared to 
the personal appraisal control group. To test this, a mixed model ANOVA was conducted 
on the CES-D scores with one within participants factor, Time (pretest/Session1, 
posttest/Session 6, 2-week follow-up, 3-month follow-up) and one between-subjects 
factor, Condition (big picture, control). Assumptions of parametric testing were assessed. 
First, upon visual inspection of box plots, it was determined that there were no outliers. 
Skewness and kurtosis values indicated there was no violation of normality. The 
assumptions of equality of variances was met; however, sphericity was violated. Due to 
the violation of sphericity, Huynh-Feldt statistics are reported. Results showed no main 
effect of time and no time by group interaction. There was a significant main effect of 
group, F (1,40) =5.14, p = 0.03, partial eta squared=.11 such that those in the big picture 
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condition endorsed higher CES-D scores at all time points as compared to those in the 
personal appraisal control condition. See figure 9. 
Figure 9 
Group Means Across Time for CES-D Scores 
 
Note. Time 1 refers to CES-D scores at pretest (Session1); Time 2 refers to CES-D scores 
at posttest (Session 6); Time 3 refers to CES-D scores at the two-week follow-up period; 
Time 4 refers to CES-D scores at the three-month follow-up period. Bars representing 
standard error depicted on graph. 
 
 Hypothesis 2c including 3-month follow-up data. Hypothesis 2c predicted that 
participants in the big picture condition would endorse less rumination at posttest and 
both the 2-week follow-up session and three-moth follow up session as compared to the 
personal appraisal control group. To test this, a mixed model ANOVA was conducted on 



























posttest/Session 6, 2-week follow-up, 3-month follow-up) and one between-subjects 
factor, Condition (big picture, control). Assumptions of parametric testing were assessed. 
First, upon visual inspection of box plots, it was determined that there were no outliers. 
Second, the assumptions of normality and equality of variances were met for each 
administration of the RRS. Finally, Mauchley’s Test of Sphericity indicated a violation, 
therefore Huynh-Felt statistics were examined in analyses.  
 Results showed no group by time interaction and no main effect of group. There 
was a significant main effect of time F (3,120) =3.27, p = 0.03, partial eta squared=.08 
such that for both groups, RRS scores decreased over time. Examination of pairwise 
comparisons show that there was a significant decrease in RRS scores between 















Group Means Across Time for RRS Scores 
 
Note. Time 1 refers to RRS scores at pretest (Session1); Time 2 refers to RRS scores at 
posttest (Session 6); Time 3 refers to RRS scores at the two-week follow-up period; Time 
4 refers to RRS scores at the three-month follow-up period. Bars representing standard 
error depicted on graph. 
 
 Hypothesis 2d including 3-month follow-up data. Hypothesis 2d was that 
participants in the big picture condition would show less depressive symptomology as 
indexed by the SCID-RV at 3 month follow-up as compared to the personal appraisal 
control condition. To test this hypothesis, results of the SCID-RV interview administered 
at the 3-month follow-up session were examined. Of the 42 participants that completed 
the 3-month follow-up SCID interview, 4 met criteria for experiencing an episode of 
























participants, 2 were in the big picture condition and 2 were in the control condition. 
There was no significant difference in endorsement of depression at the 3-month follow-













Summary and Discussion of Findings 
 The present study used cognitive-bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I) to 
train big picture appraisals of emotionally relevant events. Big picture appraisals are 
defined as those that take a broadened perspective on events, recognizing the contexts of 
an extended time perspective, the multiple domains of one’s life, and the broader human 
context. This dissertation project consisted of two primary objectives. The first objective 
was to examine whether big picture thinking could be trained using cognitive bias 
modification for interpretation and if so, to examine the extent to which training in big 
picture thinking would generalize to other tasks. The second objective was to examine 
whether the big picture condition and the personal appraisal control condition would 
differ on measures of stress reactivity, depression, and rumination. This section will 
review findings and implications from the study and consider how they relate to the 
research objectives and the extant literature. Suggestions for future research directions 
will also be discussed. 
Can big picture thinking be trained using cognitive bias modification?  
 The study provides promising evidence that big picture thinking can be induced 
using cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). Participants in the big 
picture condition transferred big picture thinking to two other tasks, one similar to the 
training task (near-transfer task) and one dissimilar to the training task (far-transfer task). 
Notably, far-transfer effects on a self-report measure of big picture thinking (The Big 
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Picture Questionnaire) were not observed. Each of these findings is discussed in more 
detail below. 
 Similarity ratings task (near-transfer task). Recall that the similarity ratings 
task consisted of 18 vignettes, presented at the conclusion of training (Session 6). Unlike 
training vignettes, which ended in either a big picture or personal interpretation, the 
similarity ratings task vignettes ended ambiguously. After reading through the similarity 
ratings task vignettes and then completing a short buffer task, participants were asked to 
provide interpretations of the similarity ratings task vignettes by choosing from three 
potential interpretations (one that was big picture, one that was personal, and one that was 
irrelevant). Results showed that participants in the big picture condition provided 
significantly more big picture interpretations of the ambiguous vignettes than did 
personal appraisal control participants.  
 This similarity ratings task represents a near-transfer task (Hertel & Mathews, 
2011) or a task with a strong degree of overlap between training and transfer. That is, the 
situations during training were similar to those in the transfer phase. This form of transfer 
task is common in the CBM-I literature as such tasks allow for the examination of the 
extent to which training in a certain form of interpretation (in this case, big picture 
thinking) generalizes to a task with similar processing requirements. Thus the results 
found for the near transfer task represent an important first step in supporting the 
generalization of training in the present study.  
 Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (far-transfer task). 
Second, participants in the big picture condition formed significantly more big picture 
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sentences on the Scrambled Sentence Task for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA) as 
compared to those in the personal appraisal control condition. The SST-BPA represents a 
far-transfer task, or a task that is different in nature from the training task. The SST-BPA 
is a performance measure which asks participants to form five word sentences from a set 
of six words while experiencing cognitive load and time pressure. As Haner and Rude 
(2015) point out, a specific strength of the SST-BPA is that it does not rely on standard 
self-report methodology. It has been suggested that scrambled sentence tasks tap into 
different aspects of an individual than self-report measures do—that this type of measure 
provides a snapshot of the mind in action rather than as an object of self-reflection 
(Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). As discussed earlier in this dissertation, cognitive models 
of depression hold that depression is caused by biases in information processing (Beck, 
1987). It is therefore important to be able to measure such processing bias as directly as 
possible.  
 Big Picture Questionnaire (far-transfer task). While the transfer of big picture 
thinking was demonstrated on the Similarity Ratings task and the SST-BPA, transfer 
effects were not observed on the Big Picture Questionnaire (BPQ). Contrary to 
hypothesis 1c, participants in the big picture condition did not demonstrate higher scores 
on the BPQ at posttest as compared to the personal appraisal control condition. Rather, 
participants in both conditions had higher scores on the BPQ at posttest as compared to 
pretest. Because the nature of the BPQ (self-report measure) is different from the nature 
of the training task (vignettes), this measure represents a far-transfer task.  Several 
explanations for the failure of far transfer to the BPQ should be considered.  
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 First, since the BPQ represents a self-report measure, it is prone to demand effects. 
Haner and Rude (2015) argue self-report measures may be more subject to demand 
effects than performance measures like the SST because they explicitly ask participants 
about their understandings of typical reactions rather than yielding an index of how the 
individual reacts in a given situation. It is possible that participants in both conditions 
assumed the purpose of the study was to change the way they handled negative emotions 
in a positive way. Thus, they may have answered the BPQ (which specifically asks 
participants to indicate what they do when they are upset or unhappy) in a way they felt 
aligned with the study purpose.  
 Another possible explanation for the lack of treatment effects relates to the fact 
that the BPQ is a trait measure that asks participants to make statements about how they 
usually behave, summarizing across a variety of situations. It is possible this measure 
would be less sensitive than the similarity ratings task or the SST-BPA to any treatment 
effects because it is summarizing across time. Because the BPQ is topographically very 
different from the other two transfer tasks (asking participants to generalize over time 
rather than provide in-the-moment interpretations), it can be argued that the BPQ 
represented the most far transfer task in the present study, and thus the most difficult task 
on which to observe generalization effects. Finally, the null results on the BPQ could 
reflect a problem with the questionnaire such that it is unable to accurately measure big 
picture thinking. While preliminary evidence suggests that the BPQ is reliable and valid 




   
Did the big picture condition and the personal appraisal control condition differ on 
measures of stress reactivity, depression, and rumination? 
 The second major aim of the study was to examine whether the big picture 
condition and the personal appraisal control condition would differ on measures of stress 
reactivity, depression, and rumination. Supporting the hypothesized benefits of the big 
picture training would have important implications for a depression vulnerable population. 
Unfortunately hypothesized group differences on the outcome measures were not found.  
Possible explanations for the lack of results will be discussed for each outcome measure 
separately below. Following this discussion, a discussion of key study factors that may 
have influenced all outcome effects will be provided. 
 Stress reactivity. Contrary to hypotheses, the big picture and personal appraisal 
control conditions did not show differences in emotional reactivity after the stressor task. 
Regarding negative mood, both the big picture and personal appraisal control condition 
endorsed significantly more negative mood after the stressor as compared to before the 
stressor. For positive mood, participants in both conditions endorsed significantly less 
positive mood after the stressor as compared to before. Both of these findings suggest the 
Remote Associations Task (RAT) was successful in inducing stress. However the 
anticipated group differences in response to such stress were not found.  
 Failure to detect significant effects for emotional reactivity is a common 
occurrence in the literature (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Yiend et al., 2014). Thus, a number 
of explanations have been offered for such null effects. The present discussion will 
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consider previous explanations as well as factors unique to the present study in an attempt 
to explain the lack of effects. First, it is possible that failure feedback on the RAT task 
was powerful enough in inducing stress that it washed-out group differences, making it 
difficult to observe training effects. In response to open ended questions asked at the end 
of the study, several participants remarked on the highly stressful nature of the RAT task. 
One participant said, “it took me a while to recover from the intelligence test [RAT].” 
This comment suggests that in the immediate aftermath of the RAT stressor, participants 
may have experienced a significant level of stress, so high that it may have been difficult 
to accurately assess for differences in emotional reactivity.  
 Another plausible explanation has to do with the type of processing required in 
regulating emotional reactivity. Recall that the dual process model of depression 
vulnerability posits that individuals engage in two types of information processing, the 
associative mode which involves quick, effortless processing, and the reflective mode 
which involves slow, effortful processing (Beevers, 2005; 2000; Lieberman et al., 2002; 
Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1999). According to this theory, individuals become 
vulnerable to depression when negatively biased associative processing is uncorrected by 
reflective processing (Beevers, 2005). Because the RAT task was administered toward 
the end of Session 6, after participants had engaged in a number of other tasks, perhaps 
fatigue effects interacted with participant’s ability to use the more effortful processing 
involved in reducing emotional reactivity. It is also possible that the timing of the 
PANAS (directly after the stressor; and toward the end of Session 6) decreased the 
likelihood of detecting group differences because it was administered too soon after the 
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stressor. Future work should consider assessing for stress reactivity over a longer period 
of time, allowing for the measure of processing effects that may take more time to 
operate. 
 One final explanation for the lack of stress reactivity effects has to do with the 
nature of the RAT stressor. The RAT stressor task is aimed at inducing achievement 
threat in participants, but it does not measure threats to other domains (e.g. social 
acceptance).  It is possible that the RAT stressor did not represent the most appropriate 
stressor task for the present study. CBM studies have used a variety of stressor tasks in 
the examination of emotional reactivity. One stressor that has been used in several studies 
(Lester et al., 2011; Yiend et al., 2014) involves watching a distressing film. It may be 
that this represents the type of stressor (sad experiences observed in life) that big picture 
thinking may prove helpful in managing. Furthermore, Hallion and Ruscio (2011) call for 
the need to assess emotional reactivity in the context of naturally occurring stressors. 
Rather than the RAT, which is a laboratory stressor, it may be important for future 
studies to assess the extent to which training may affect stressors encountered in 
everyday life. It will be important for future studies to include different types of stressors 
in order to gain a clearer picture of ways in which big picture thinking may prove 
beneficial for emotional reactivity.  
 There has been a movement in the CBM field (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) toward 
including a measure of emotional reactivity both before CBM training as well as after 
CBM training in order to allow for an assessment of changes in emotional reactivity over 
time. The present study originally planned to have both a pre-training stressor as well as a 
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post-training stressor, however, due to the time demands on participants, the first stressor 
was removed. Future work should include such a pre-training measure in order to get a 
clearer picture of the potential effects of big picture thinking on stress reactivity. 
 Depression. Contrary to study hypotheses, there was no significant group by time 
interaction for the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression scale (CES-D). There 
was a significant main effect of group such that those in the big picture condition 
endorsed higher CES-D scores at all time points (pretest, posttest, 2 week follow-up, 3 
month follow-up) as compared to those in the personal appraisal control condition. In 
considering these results, it must be noted that although participants were randomly 
assigned to condition by the Qualtrics survey software program, participants in the big 
picture condition endorsed significantly more depression at pre-test. This surprising pre-
treatment difference is an obstacle to interpretation.  
 The fact that the groups started with very different depression scores may have 
obscured or dampened the predicted treatment differences. For example, previous 
research (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010) suggests CBM interventions yield 
most benefit for those with milder depression levels. It is possible that those with more 
depression are experiencing cognitive deficits that may make it more difficult to use 
appraisal such as big picture thinking, resulting in a lack of effects on measures such as 
emotional reactivity, depression symptom change, and rumination. 
 On the other hand, it is also possible that the pre-group differences in depression 
scores worked in the opposite direction, making the big picture group more likely to 
experience treatment effects. While this particular outcome was not found in the present 
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study, the more important point is that the pre-test differences on the CES-D make it 
difficult to compare groups or to understand the mechanisms at play in the results. While 
failures of randomization of this magnitude are extremely rare, in the future, it may be 
advisable for future work to create matched pairs based on pre-test depression scores and 
to randomize within these matched pairs.  
 Rumination. There were no significant differences in the Ruminative Responses 
Scale (RRS) between the big picture condition and the personal appraisal control 
condition at posttest (session 6), at the 2-week follow up period, or at the 3-month 
follow-up period. Additionally, there was no group main effect for rumination. There was 
a trend toward a significant time main effect without the 3-month follow-up data included, 
and a significant main effect of time when the 3-month follow-up period was included in 
analysis.   
 The lack of interaction effects on the RRS may indicate that big picture appraisal 
does not have a unique impact on rumination. Such null results prove important for future 
studies because they suggest the need to evaluate other outcomes by which CBM-I for 
big picture appraisal may be effective and beneficial. Additional explanations for the lack 
of treatment effects for rumination relate to study factors that may have impacted all 
outcome measures. These factors are considered below. 
Key Study Factors Related to all Outcome Measures 
 Nature of the personal appraisal control condition. It is important to consider 
study factors that may have influenced the ability to find group differences for all 
outcomes. First, it is possible that the personal appraisal control condition was not 
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distinct enough from the experimental condition to elicit any differential outcome effects. 
Many studies in the CBM literature (e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) compare 
positive training to negative training, which is arguably more likely to show contrasting 
effects. Comparing big picture training to a personal appraisal training is a much subtler 
distinction than training positive versus negative. Furthermore, in the creation of the 
control condition, much attention and effort was devoted to matching the valence of the 
big picture condition so that one condition was not more likely to induce negative mood. 
Additionally, it was important to avoid inadvertently training a bias to expect only 
negative events. To address these concerns, some of the vignettes were negative in 
valence (describing adverse events) and some were positive in valence (describing 
fortunate events). Consider the following examples of vignettes. The endings for both 
conditions (big picture and personal appraisal control) are provided.  
  
 Negative event: 
 You recently gave a presentation at work and received some critical feedback 
 from your boss. Although you had waited until the last minute to prepare the 
 presentation, you went into it thinking your content was pretty good. As you look 
 back over your slides you realize that (some talks go better than oth_rs) [others, 
 Big Picture]/ (You’re generally a g_od speaker) [good, Personal Appraisal 
 Control].  
  
 Positive event: 
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 It is your birthday, and several friends take you out for a celebratory meal at one 
 of your favorite restaurants. Everyone laughs a lot and seems to enjoy the 
 evening. As the waiter comes over with the check, you think about how much you 
 enjoy (feeling close and connect_d with others) [connected, Big Picture]/ (being 
 popul_r and well-liked) [popular, Personal Appraisal Control]. 
  
 It can be argued that the personal appraisal control condition posed a particularly 
stringent test of the big picture training because it was intended to be at least as positive 
in valence. In creating such a stringent control, the hope was to be able to show that in the 
long run, it is more helpful to take a big picture perspecitve than a personal perspective. 
However, this creates a “high bar” for obtaining a training effect. Several comments from 
participants throughout the study suggest that the personal appraisal control condition 
induced positive interpretations. In response to open-ended questions at the end of the 
study, one control participant noted, “I felt good about myself a lot while taking the 
study.” Another said, “I started narrating the stories in everyday experiences by thinking 
things like ‘I am smart’ or ‘I can do this’”. Given the nature of the control condition, 
which may have had an overall positive tone, it may have been especially difficult to 
detect group differences on outcome measures. Additionally, it is possible that the time 
main effects for the Big Picture Questionnaire and the Ruminative Response Scale 
indicate that both the personal appraisal control condition and the big picture condition 
led to positive effects (increase in big picture thinking and decrease in rumination).  
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 Another possible explanation for the time main effects for the BPQ and the RRS 
includes the idea that the nature of the training task in both conditions served to increase 
big picture thinking. Both conditions involved reading a series of personally relevant 
scenarios, some positive in nature, others negative. It is possible that such a task is 
inherently perspective-giving in that it implicitly encourages one to reflect on the big 
picture notion of an extended time perspective. This perspective includes the idea that life 
is full of positive and negative occurrences and a way to see the big picture is to 
appreciate an event within a larger context of time.  
 Non-compliance and fatigue. Another concern in considering the data in the 
present study is the lack of control over participant compliance. Blackwell et al. (2010) 
speak to this concern, pointing out that CBM protocols often do not allow the researchers 
to be certain of the extent to which participants complied with the task demands while 
completing the CBM-I sessions at home. Furthermore, Hallion and Ruscio (2011) 
highlight the solitary and repetitive nature of most CBM paradigms, suggesting these 
factors may contribute to the problem of participant compliance and fatigue. In the 
present study, there were indicators of such non-compliance. For example, while 
participants were asked to complete each successive training session within 24-48 hours 
of the previous session, participants varied in their duration between sessions. 
Additionally, in response to open-ended questions at the end of Session 6, several 
participants remarked on feeling distracted or stepping away from the session to complete 
other tasks while at home. Due to such factors, it is possible that the results of the present 
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study do not reflect he full potential of the training schedule. Future studies should 
consider ways of controlling for compliance. 
 The outcome measures in the present study (PANAS, CES-D, RRS) may have 
been particularly susceptible to participant fatigue due to a couple of factors. First, during 
posttest (Session 6), the stressor task, the CES-D, and the RRS were administered at the 
end of the session, after participants had already engaged in training items as well as the 
similarity ratings task (which involved reading 18 additional vignettes, completing a 
buffer task, and then the recognition ratings task). Arguably, these tasks require 
significant cognitive effort. By the time participants reached the end of the session and 
were completing the self-report measures, they may have been more likely to gloss over 
these items or answer carelessly.  
 Nature of the outcome measures. There are several characteristics of the CES-D, 
RRS, and BPQ that may have reduced the likelihood of detecting treatment effects. First, 
it can be argued that the self-report outcome measures were less engaging than other parts 
of the study such as the training vignettes, the scrambled sentences, or the stressor task. 
Thus, it is possible participants approached these measures with less care.   
 As mentioned previously self-report measures are prone to demand effects. It is 
possible that participants in both conditions assumed the purpose of the study was to 
change the way they handled negative emotions in a positive way. Thus, they may have 
answered the BPQ and RRS in a way they felt aligned with the study purpose. Fox, 
Mackintosh, and Holmes (2014) point out that many studies rely on self-report measures 
of clinical outcomes with few studies incorporating behavioral or somatic indicators of 
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relevant symptoms. Perhaps other measures such as health behaviors or somatic indices 
could provide information relevant to CBM’s effect on symptoms related to depression.  
 Theory. A final explanation for the null effects in the present study is the idea 
that big picture appraisal is not beneficial for those prone to depression. There are several 
limiting conditions of the study and the theory of big picture appraisal that are worth 
noting. First, it is possible that the CBM methodology used in the present study is not a 
good match for individuals prone to depression. CBM requires consistent cognitive effort 
and attention. If those prone to depression are experiencing cognitive deficits, it is 
possible they are less likely to fully engage in CBM procedures. Additionally, it is 
possible that big picture thinking is not powerful in influencing depression vulnerable 
individuals. It is possible that there may be a type of depression vulnerability (e.g. a 
specific type of cognitive bias), or a degree of depression vulnerability (e.g. two or more 
previous episodes), that influences the extent to which people will respond well to a big 
picture intervention. One useful next step would be to identify subgroups of depression 
vulnerable participants with different Big Picture Appraisal deficits (as measures on the 
BPQ). Perhaps treatment would differentially affect those with pre-existing deficits. 
Implications of the Present Study and Next Steps 
 The present study addresses a number of gaps in the literature and suggests 
important next steps in the CBM field. This section will highlight the important 
contributions of the present study as well as the implications of findings.  
 Study population. First, the application of CBM-I to a depression vulnerable 
population addresses an important frontier. As Macloed and Mathews (2012) point out, 
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much research has demonstrated the effectiveness of CBM-I in alleviating anxiety, 
however, little work has examined the effects of CBM-I on depression. The depression 
vulnerable population is of particular interest because research indicates that those who 
have experienced depression in the past are more likely to relapse than those who have 
not (Mueller et al., 1999; Solomon et al., 1997). In fact, Judd et al. (1997) found that at 
least 50% of patients who recover from an initial episode of depression will have at least 
one subsequent depressive episode. If effective treatments can reduce the likelihood of 
depressive relapse for this group, this has significant implications for the field of 
depression research. 
Thus far, no CBM studies have used a depression vulnerable population. The 
existing CBM studies examining depression have either used individuals currently 
experiencing depression (Watkins et al., 2012; Micco et al., 2014; Blackwell & Holmes, 
2010; Lang et al., 2012; Torkan et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2013; Yiend et al., 2013), or 
dysphoric individuals (Mean BDI-II = 27.85; Newby et al., 2014). In these studies, 
results have been mixed. Some studies have found effects for depressed individuals when 
CBM is paired with forms of CBT (Watkins et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2013), others 
have found improvements in interpretation bias or emotional reactivity but not in 
depression or anxiety symptom change (e.g. Micco et al., 2014), while others have 
observed improvements in depression and anxiety symptoms (e.g. Williams et al., 2013; 
Torkan et al., 2014). Due to the mixed results in the existent literature, future work is 
needed to obtain a clear picture of the potential benefits of CBM for depression, and more 
specifically, for a depression vulnerable population.   
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One line of research that has studied the depression vulnerable population is 
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression (MBCT). In this research, effects 
have been more prominent for participants that had experienced multiple depressive 
episodes in the past (Williams et al., 2013). Future work should use a diagnostic 
interview, such as the SCID-RV used in the present study, to define a depression 
vulnerable sample. Additionally, in order to build upon the current sample, which only 
required one previous depressive episode, future work should include a sample with a 
more severe history of depression. 
 Training procedure. Within recent CBM work, there has been a strong call for 
research aimed at optimizing methods of shifting maladaptive biases (Fox et all, 2014). 
The training in the present study built on a number of previous findings in an effort to 
develop a more powerful CBM-I procedure. Specific strengths of the procedure that 
should be considered for use in future studies are discussed below. 
 First, the training used in the current study emphasized participants’ use of 
imagery as they completed training sessions. This was accomplished through various 
means including training in imagery for both groups during Session 1 as well as prompts 
throughout the training sessions reminding participants to utilize imagery as they read or 
listened to the scenarios. Previous work argues that imagery may have a more powerful 
impact on emotional responses than verbal processing (Holmes et al., 2006). Therefore, 
according to Lang et al. (2012), repeated practice in generating adaptive imagery in 
response to ambiguous stimuli is particularly applicable to the treatment of depression. 
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Future work should continue to find creative ways to incorporate imagery in CBM 
interventions. 
 A number of steps were taken in the present study to increase participants’ 
engagement in training and to enhance the impact of training. For example the training 
incorporated auditory vignettes in addition to written vignettes. Previous work (Lang et 
al., 2012) as well as anecdotal information gathered from participants during the 3-month 
follow-up suggests the auditory vignettes helped participants maintain interest and 
concentration. Anecdotal comments from participants suggested they found the auditory 
items to be a welcome reprieve from the written vignettes, of which there were more. 
Future studies should consider including more auditory vignettes, perhaps a number equal 
to the number of written items. 
 The current study also utilized repeated training sessions over the course of a 
week (6 training sessions in total), representing a departure from much previous CBM 
work, which often includes one training session (e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). In 
their meta-analysis on CBM, Hallion and Ruscio (2011) found a trend such that those 
studies that included more than one training session were more likely to demonstrate 
effects. This finding led these researchers to call for future studies to examine the 
parameters of these findings (i.e. how many training sessions are optimal in CBM-I 
studies). Future work should extend upon the present study by examining whether 
additional training sessions would increase the power to detect treatment effects. Future 
researchers should use creativity in considering ways such sessions could be delivered. 
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For example, perhaps a smartphone application with CBM auditory items could be 
developed for participants to use at their discretion. 
 One last strength of the training used in the present study is the inclusion of the 
personal control condition. As mentioned previously, the inclusion of this condition, 
which was aimed at inducing a personal interpretation of vignettes while matching the 
valence of the big picture condition, provided a strong comparison group. Rather than 
comparing to an overtly negative control (as many previous CBM studies have done) or a 
no-treatment control, the control used in this study allowed for the examination of the 
extent to which big picture may prove beneficial over and above a common personal 
interpretation of events. Given the success of inducing big picture thinking in the present 
study (as shown on the transfer tasks), it is important to continue to assess outcome 
effects of big picture as compared to common appraisal styles. In addition to continuing 
to use the personal appraisal control used in the present study, it is recommended that 
future studies also incorporate a no-treatment control. This will allow for an examination 
of how both a big picture interpretive style and a personal interpretive style compare to 
the effects of no training. Furthermore, future work should collect information ratings 
indicating how positively or negatively the vignettes in both conditions are viewed in 
order to get a better picture of the overal valence of the training conditions. The fact that 
this was not done in the current study is a limitation. 
 Follow-up sessions. Finally, the inclusion of the 2-week and 3-month follow-up 
sessions in the present study represents an important addition to the field. Hallion and 
Ruscio (2011) point to the need to have longer term follow-up sessions in CBM studies in 
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order to assess for any gradual changes in symptoms that CBM might produce. 
Furthermore, Lancaster et al. (2004) call for the need for studies include follow up 
assessments in order to estimate feasibility parameters including response rates, selection 
of most appropriate outcomes and testing of data collection methods. Such information 
has important implications for the timing of CBM treatments and the power of its effects. 
While the current study only included self-report measures in the two-week and 3-month 
follow-up sessions, future studies should consider using alternative outcome measures 
such as physiological measures or additional stressor tasks in order to examine the extent 
to which CBM effects last over time. 
Conclusions  
 The present study provides promising evidence that big picture thinking can be 
trained using CBM-I methods. Participants in the big picture condition demonstrated 
transfer of training to a near and a far transfer task. While transfer effects were observed, 
effects on emotional reactivity, depression, and rumination were not. It is possible big 
picture thinking does not impact depression, however, the many possible explanations for 
the null effects found in the present study call for the importance of continuing to 
investigate this area. Future work is needed to assess the potential benefits training in big 
picture thinking can have for a depression vulnerable population. 
 The finding that big picture training generalized on both near and far transfer 
tasks should not be understated. Such results add the current literature by providing 
important information about optimal CBM-I procedures. The training procedure used in 
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this study should be replicated in future studies in order to explore potential benefits and 
applications of big picture thinking.  
 The lack of findings regarding clinical effects is a common occurrence in the 
CBM literature. In the commentary on the CMB special issue in Cognitive Therapy and 
Research (Fox, et al., 2014), a pioneering researcher in the CBM field, Bundy 
Mackintosh, discusses what she calls an “important dilemma in the CBM field”. She goes 
on to describe the dilemma saying, “we have good paradigms and there are many well 
designed studies. However, often we do not find what we expect, particularly regarding 
the clinical effects. This does not mean that CBM doesn’t work. Moreover, null results 
are crucial and informative. But maybe this is an indication that CBM effects are much 
more subtle or experimental than we think?” (p. 241). Following from this, there is a call 
for future work to identify the boundary conditions and mechanisms underlying CBM 
effects.  
 The CBM field is still in its infancy. The present study represents an important 
contribution to the literature because it introduces a unique and effective way to train big 
picture thinking. Future work is needed in order to fully examine the potential 
































1. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 0 1 2 3 
2. Analyze recent events to try to understand why 
you are depressed 
0 1 2 3 
3. Think “Why do I always react this way?” 
 
0 1 2 3 
4. Go away by yourself and think about why you 
feel this way. 
 
0 1 2 3 
5. Write down what you are thinking and analyze it. 0 1 2 3 
6. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had 
gone better. 
0 1 2 3 
7. Think “Why do I have problems other people 
don’t have?” 
0 1 2 3 
8. Think, “Why can’t I handle things better?” 
 
0 1 2 3 
9. Analyze your personality and try to understand 
why you are depressed. 
 
0 1 2 3 
10. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings. 
 








Below is a list of some of the ways you may have felt or behaved. Please indicate how 
often you have felt this way during the past week by checking the appropriate space. 
 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me. 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends. 
4. I felt that I was just as good as other people. 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
6. I felt depressed. 
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
8. I felt hopeful about the future. 
9. I thought my life had been a failure. 
10. I felt fearful. 
11. My sleep was restless. 
12. I was happy. 
13. I talked less than usual. 
14. I felt lonely. 
15. People were unfriendly. 
16. I enjoyed life. 
17. I had crying spells. 
18. I felt sad. 
19. I felt that people disliked me. 
20. I could not get "going." 
 
THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE PROVIDED FOR EACH ITEM: 
1. Rarely or none of the time (Less than 1 day) 
2. Some of a Little of the Time (1-2 days) 
3. Occasionally or a Moderate Amount of the Time (3-4 days) 








Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire 
 
Directions: 
Please think back to times when you have felt upset or unhappy.  Many different 
situations provoke such feelings (e.g., when you felt you had failed or did not live up to 
your own or others' expectations, or when you experienced a loss, or felt rejected), and 
the emotions involved may vary (e.g., hurt, anger, sadness, grief, jealousy).  Rate each of 
the following items on a scale from 1 to 5 to indicate how often you have had thoughts 




              1-----------------2------------------3-------------------4-------------------5 
         Never                  Rarely             Sometimes         Frequently                Very  
                                                                                      Frequently 
Stem: 
When I am upset or unhappy… 
 
1. I remember that other aspects of my life are going better.  
2. I remind myself that I will grow from this experience.  
3. I know that other areas of my life are going okay.  
4. I remind myself that painful experiences are a part of everyone's life.  
5. I know I will be able to come to terms with this.  
6. I reflect on how people I know have gone through similar situations.  
7. I know this situation will teach me things.  
8. I understand that the situation will look different to me after some time passes.  
9. I view this as a part of life's lessons.  
10. I stay aware of what I can do well.  
11. I find inspiration in other people's experiences.  
12. it feels like I will be wiser from this.  
13. I remind myself that what I am experiencing is something everyone feels.  
14. I know there is value in painful experiences.  
15. I remind myself that I have felt this bad before and come out of it.  
16. I know that this is only part of my life.  
17. I realize that I will learn from this.  
18. I am aware that other people often feel the way that I do.  
19. I remind myself that suffering is part of life.  
20. I know there is value in experiencing my emotions fully.  
21. I remind myself that everyone suffers sometimes.  
22. I know that others share experiences like mine.  







Scrambled Sentence Task (Big Picture Version) 
 
1  mostly  others to I’m similar  
2  can  I learn fear cannot  from 2 
3  think I pain lasting  is temporary   
4  badly people often few all  feel  
5  doesn’t  me suffering wiser make does   
6  weird  I normal  think I am  
7  seldom  most bad feel people often   
8  quickly painful cannot  shift can  emotions  
9  my weak human  show faults I’m  
10  don’t  me do  difficult damage situations  
11  like everyone  has noone  feelings me  
12  sadness tends linger pass  always to  
13  do  learn I don’t  failures from  
14  experience few  other many  failure people  
15  believe I shameful human  is sadness  
16  to end seems anxiety always never   
17  unlike  really others am I like   
18  things time do don’t  with improve  
19  happens rejection some  people all  to  
20  sadness cannot  from learn can  I  
21  people insecurities have do  all don’t   
22  problems grown I have  from haven’t   
23  lasting is  long suffering isn’t  often  
24  happen to painful me  events everyone   
25  experiences cannot  me can  teach painful  
26  unusual  people rejection all  experience  
27  stay does  usually distress doesn’t  around  
28  last  moods to seem pass  bad  
29  me painful do  experiences don’t  benefit  
30  means mistakes normal  making flawed  I’m  
31  sadness doesn’t  lessons bring valuable does   
32  other no  scared many  feel people  
33  fairly  I’m not  think I typical  
34  moods away go do  bad don’t   
35  are feelings my definitely  universal not   
36  failure my indicate humanness worth   
37  learn I rejection may  from won’t   
38  inappropriate  having is clearly human  anxiety  
39  nervous often people feel few all   






Phone Screen: Demographics Information 
 
SCID Telephone Screening 
 
Temporary ID ____________________  Interviewer _________________ Date 
___________ 
 
Okay with follow-up phone call: ______ YES  _______ NO 
 
Times later today: _________________________________________ 
 
Times tomorrow: _________________________________________ 
 




Home Phone: __________________________________ 
Work Phone: ___________________________________ 
Email address: __________________________________ 
 
Where would you prefer to be contacted? What time of day? 
 ______________________ 
Alternate Contact Name/ Number: _________________________________________ 
 




_______ Participant verbally agreed to voluntarily give informed consent to participate in study 
_______ Participant did NOT agree to voluntarily give informed consent to participate in study 
 
Meets age requirement (18-60): ______ YES  _______ NO 
 











1. Sex   circle one:   Male/ Female 
 
2. Age   _________________________________________ 
Date of Birth  _________________________________________ 
 
PART 2 (If eligible) 
 
1. What is your ethnicity _________________________________________ 
 
2. What is your highest level of education? (i.e. high school degree, GED, 4-yr college_ 
 
 
3. Are you currently working?  Circle one:   Yes/ No 
 If yes: what do you do? _________________________________________ 
 If no: when was the last time you worked? What did you do then? 
__________________ 
 
4. Have you ever been diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder?    YES/NO 
 
5. Have you ever been diagnosed with an eating disorder?    YES/NO 
 
6. Do you have Dyslexia or another type of difficulty that makes reading difficult for 
you? YES/NO 
 
7. Is English your first language? YES/NO 
 If “NO”, how would you rate your fluency with English? 
 
1   2   3   4  
 5 
not     Moderately     Very 
fluent 
fluent      fluent    
at all 
 
8. Do you take psychotropic medications (mood medications)? YES/NO 
If “YES”, have you made any changes to your psychotropic medications in the last 
month? YES/NO 
 If “YES”, ask them to describe the changes. 
 
9. Do you attend psychotherapy? YES/NO 
If “YES”, have you made any changes to your therapy in the last month?  YES/NO 




10. If they take psychotropic medecations and or are in psychotherapy, ask: 
Do you expect to make any changes to your medication or therapy during the time of the 
study? YES/NO 
If “YES”, we ask that you do not make changes to your medications or therapy during the 




SUMMARY (circle as appropriate)  Inclusion/ Exclusion for study 
 
If ineligible for study- reason(s): 
______________________________________________ 
 
COMPLETE FOR EVERY SCREEN: 
Depression    past  current  none 
Bipolar Disorder   dx  none 
Psychosis    dx  none 
Substance Abuse- Alcohol  dx  none 
Substance Abuse- Drug  dx  none 
 
FYI: INCLUSION/ EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
 Inclusion     Exclusion 
 Depression- past (over 2 months ago) Depression- current (within last 2 
months) 
       At risk for suicide 
       Bipolar Disorder (past or current) 
       Psychosis (past or current) 
       Alcohol or Drug- current (within last 
6 mo.) 









This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Please indicate the degree to which the following words describe you at this moment.  
Right now I feel: 
 
 1   2      3        4          5 
very slightly             a little   moderately  quite a bit      
extremely 
or not at all 
 
______ interested      
______ guilty         
_____ irritable     
______ determined       
______ distressed      
______ scared     
_____ alert          
______ attentive 
______ excited    
______ hostile        
_____ ashamed        
______ jittery 
______ upset     
______ enthusiastic   
_____ inspired       
______ active 
______ strong     
______ proud    
______ nervous    









Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) 
Please rate the vividness of each image by reference to the rating scale shown below: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Perfectly Clear 






clear and vivid Vague and dim 




thinking of the 
object) 
Think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not with you at 
present), and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye.  Then rate 
the following items: 
1 The exact contour of face, head, shoulders, and body. 
2 Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. 
3 The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking. 
4 The different colors worn in some familiar clothes. 
Visualize a rising sun.  Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye.  
Then rate the following items.  
5 The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky. 
6 The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness. 
7 Clouds.  A storm blows up, with flashes of lightning. 
8 A rainbow appears. 
 Think of the front of a shop to which you often go.  Consider the picture that comes 
before your mind's eye.  Then rate the following items. 
9 The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the road. 
10 A window display including colors, shapes, and details of   individual items for sale. 
11 You are near the entrance.  The color, shape, and details of the door. 
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12 You enter the shop and go to the counter.  The counter assistant serves you.  Money changes hands. 
    Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake.  Consider 
the picture that comes before your mind's eye.  Then rate the following items. 
13 The contours of the landscape. 
14 The color and shape of the trees. 
15 The color and shape of the lake. 








Remote Associations Task (RAT) 
 
The next part of the study is a word task that serves as a measure of verbal intelligence.  
 
For the task, you will be presented with three words on your screen. Your goal is to think 
of a fourth word that is related to the words on the screen. When you think of a fourth 
word, write the word in the text box provided.  
 
Click below to see an example. 
 
Here's an example. Remember, you are trying to think of a fourth word that related to the 
three words below. 
 
Athletes  web  rabbit 
 
The correct answer is "foot" because "foot is related to each of the three words, as in 
"athlete's foot," "webbed foot," and "rabbit's foot," so the word "foot" would go in the 
text box provided. Go ahead and write "foot" in the box. 
 
There will be 15 sets of words. You will have 30 seconds to look at each set and record 
your answer in the box. Then, the next item will be presented. Please write an answer for 
every item, even if it is just a guess. If you don't write anything in the box, your answer 
will be counted wrong.  
 
If you feel like you're not doing well, don't worry, most college students do not get more 
than 10 of the 15 problems correct.  
 
This task is important because we need a measure of verbal intelligence that we can 
compare to your reading comprehension scores. 
 
Keep in mind as you do this task that no measure of intelligence is completely reliable. 
 
When you are finished, you will be given feedback regarding your performance.  
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